Management Stock Ownership,Financing Constraints And Enterprise Innovation Investment

An enterprise needs to rely on innovation if it wants to develop.At the national level,we can see that a country's national competitiveness and its economic status in the world's powerful countries depend to a large extent on the country's innovation ability.In recent years,China's economic development model has been criticized by many domestic and foreign economists.That is because this extensive model will bring economic benefits to the country in the short term,but in the long run,it lacks the ability to innovate and is useless for long-term interests.Therefore,in order to realize the economic transformation in our country at this stage,we must solve a problem,that is,to enhance the innovation ability of enterprises.Therefore,in recent years,Chinese enterprises are constantly developing and innovating,so China's capital market has entered a new period of growth.However,development will inevitably accompany the emergence of problems,so on this road of continuous innovation,we also encounter many new problems to be solved.Principal-agent problem and prospect theory make the interests of shareholders and executives separate.The relationship and influence between executive equity incentive and innovation investment(R&D)is always an important research content in the process of company development and management.Enterprise innovation investment(R&D)can not only promote the steady improvement of enterprise economy,but also create lasting competitive advantages for the economic development of enterprises.However,we have to consider a problem,that is,as the decision-maker of enterprise innovation investment,senior managers show risk aversion,they will consider their own interests in most cases,refuse to take excessive risks,which will naturally have a negative impact on enterprise innovation investment.Especially when executives are about to retire,out of the risk aversion mentality,or when the interests of enterprises are declining,the managers of enterprises have greater profitability to choose to avoid risks and reduce the R&D expenditure of enterprises.In contemporary society,the separation of power and power in enterprises is becoming more and more obvious.Although shareholders own the ownership of enterprises,executives are the operators of companies.Shareholders'trustees make decisions on the important strategies of companies.Innovation investment is an important investment in the development of companies,so managers also need to make decisions on it.Because of the special nature of innovative investment projects,compared with general investment,they have high risk,long payback period and great uncertainty,so managers tend to be cautious in this decision-making,which is characterized by profitability and risk aversion in advance.In addition,innovative investment projects are more professional,so it is difficult to evaluate,which is likely to make senior management will take R&D innovation resources as their own.Whether inside or outside the enterprise,there are factors affecting the innovation investment of the enterprise.The capital market of our country is ineffective,and there are problems of information asymmetry.Most enterprises will face financing constraints and be affected by them.Enterprises need innovation investment to grow,but innovation investment needs a lot of capital.Therefore,our country's enterprises are generally weak in innovation ability,and one of the most critical reasons for less investment in innovation is the lack of funds caused by external financing constraints.Therefore,focusing on the two aspects of managerial ownership and enterprise innovation investment(R&D),this paper mainly analyses the impact of managerial ownership on enterprise innovation investment(R&D),as well as the adjustment variable of adding financing constraints,and explores the restraining effect of financing constraints on the relationship between managerial ownership and R&D of Chinese enterprises,as well as the strong restraining effect at different stages of enterprise life cycle.Different degrees.In the existing research,most scholars mainly study the positive correlation between executive compensation incentive policy and innovation investment of enterprises,as well as the restraint of financing constraints on innovation investment of enterprises.This paper chooses small and medium-sized board and GEM listed companies in China from 2013 to 2017 as research samples to empirically analyze the impact of managerial ownership on Innovation investment of enterprises.On this basis,we discuss the restraining effect of financing constraints on the relationship between managerial ownership and R&D of Chinese enterprises,and the different intensity of this restraining effect in different life cycle stages of enterprises.This paper has the following research results:(1)managerial ownership has a positive correlation with innovation investment;(2)financing constraints have a restraining effect on the relationship between managerial ownership and R&D financing constraints of Chinese enterprises,and financing constraints will weaken the role of managerial ownership in promoting R&D investment of Chinese enterprises;(3)financing constraints at different stages of life cycle.The restraining effect on the relationship between managerial ownership and R&D of Chinese enterprises is different.