Research On The Impact Of Institutional Investors' Shareholdings On Corporate Debt Financing Costs

External financing is an important factor to promote the rapid and healthy development of enterprises.Because of the widespread problems of information asymmetry and agency cost,the cost of external financing channels of listed enterprises is relatively high,and financing constraints are widespread in enterprises.Based on the current situation of the expanding scale of institutional investors,this paper finds that the debt cost of institutional investors is much lower than that of inorganic investors in recent years through the statistics of debt cost of listed companies.Institutional investors,as professional investors,can dig in-depth enterprise information and participate in corporate decision-making voting as shareholders,which may help to solve the moral hazard and agency problems caused by information asymmetry between internal and external investors.For enterprises,debt financing cost is the risk premium required by information risk and agency cost because of information asymmetry between creditors and enterprises.Therefore,it is very important for enterprises to explore the relationship between institutional investors' shareholding and the cost of corporate debt financing,to study how to obtain a larger scale of financing at a lower cost,and to achieve long-term high-quality development.A good internal corporate governance structure and management level will help companies to disclose high-quality information,reduce creditor information risks,and help constrain management speculation and reduce agency costs.By supervising management behavior,institutional investors can reduce agency costs,enhance corporate governance and information quality,thereby improving their long-term development capabilities and debt repayment levels.As the quality of corporate information and the level of protection of creditors' rights increase,the risk premium of creditors for lending funds will also decrease.The existing research pays less attention to the relationship between institutional investors' shareholdings and corporate debt financing costs,leaving some research space for this article.This paper presents four main assumptions and designs related models.The empirical analysis selected a total of 9447 observations of A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2017,and conducted multiple regression,threshold regression and group analysis.The use of lag variables and instrumental variables to reduce the limitations of endogenous problems and based on debt financing costs.The different measures of the scale of institutional holdings were tested for robustness.The results show that:(1)institutional investors can reduce the cost of corporate debt financing,and the shareholding ratio is negatively correlated with the cost of debt financing;(2)the financing cost of corporate debt after the institutional investor's shareholding ratio exceeds 13.3911%The reduction effect is significantly reduced;(3)independent institutional investors can play an active role in governance,effectively reducing corporate debt financing costs,while independent institutional investors cannot alleviate corporate debt financing constraints;(4)stable institutional investors can have More time and greater discourse power oversees management speculation and strengthens internal corporate governance,thereby effectively reducing corporate debt financing costs,while transactional institutional investors do not improve corporate debt financing.This paper enriches the research on the governance effect of institutional investors,supplements and improves the mechanism of reducing corporate debt financing costs,and helps enterprises to find ways to reduce financing costs,thereby expanding the scale of financing and promoting rapid development of enterprises.This article has a total of 7 pictures,14 tables,reference 79 articles.