Research On Tunnel Behavior Of Major Shareholders Of Listed Companies To Reduce Their Holdings

This paper takes the reduction of the major shareholders of letv as a case to study and analyze the problem that the major shareholders infringe the interests of the small and medium-sized shareholders through reduction.In the era of full circulation of China's capital market,the major shareholders of some listed companies frequently reduce their holdings,which infringes on the interests of the small and medium-sized shareholders.At this time,the regulatory level also constantly introduces policies to regulate the reduction of the major shareholders.We selected cases happened in this period.This paper combed the predecessor to the problem of the major shareholders holdings and emptying of related research,in its path,reduce its motivation,reduce its influence on research,on the basis of information asymmetry,the principal-agent,control gains,signaling classic theory as the support,mainly using the literature research,case studies,event study and comparative analysis methods such as case analysis of comprehensive and deep research for this article.In the case of this paper,the major shareholders of listed companies use their own advantages of control,use information control and earnings management to drive up the stock price,and choose the opportunity to reduce their holdings through bulk transactions and negotiated transfers.After cash reduction,they violate the loan commitments and achieve private gains for the major shareholders.However,the reduction of the major shareholders has brought about negative market reaction.After the reduction,the interests of the small and medium-sized shareholders are seriously damaged,which is reflected in the decline of share price,the reduction of dividends and the decline of operating performance indicators.Such behavior also reduces the effectiveness of the capital market.Through in-depth analysis of the case,it is found that the main reason for the major shareholders to use a variety of means to cooperate with the reduction of holdings and implement tunnel behavior is that there are loopholes in the market's constraint mechanism for the major shareholders to reduce holdings.Second,there are regulatory loopholes in the market mechanism for the additional performance of obligations.Third,the regulatory agency's punishment means are relatively single,the punishment intensity is insufficient.Based on the above problems,this paper puts forward suggestions on improving the regulatory system,strengthening information disclosure,increasing punishment for violations,and improving the investor protection system,so as to realize the standardized reduction of major shareholders in the capital market of listed companies in China.