Industrial Policy,accounting Information And Debt Constracts

The development of a country needs the organic combination of market power and government power,and industrial policy is an important tool to realize this combination.Enterprises supported by industrial policies may gain many benefits,such as government subsidies,special preferences and so on.At the same time,the supported enterprises may also obtain the bank's inclined debt resources,and accounting information plays an important role in the formulation of the terms of debt contracts and in monitoring the implementation of these terms.This paper aims to explore whether industrial policy will affect the role of accounting information in bank loans.Based on the empirical data of A-share non-financial listed companies from 2001 to 2015,this paper empirically examines the impact of industrial policy on the usefulness of accounting information debt contracts by using factor analysis and multiple regression methods,and reveals the economic consequences of industrial policy from the perspective of the usefulness of debt contracts.The results show that the accounting information of enterprises supported by industrial policies plays a lower role in debt contracts than that of enterprises not supported by industrial policies.This paper divides the samples into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises to study the impact of industrial policies on accounting information of enterprises with different property rights in debt contracts.The study finds that the significant impact of industrial policy on the usefulness of accounting information debt contracts only exists in state-owned enterprises;the test results of the probability of default after the event show that the low usefulness of accounting information debt contracts supported by industrial policy is mainly due to the fact that various preferential policies of the government play an implicit role in guaranteeing corporate loans.It is not the result of direct government intervention in bank loan decision-making.This paper further divides the samples into two categories according to the stage of industry development and the degree of marketization.The results show that there is no significant difference between the growth industry and the mature industry in the reduction of the usefulness of the debt contract of accounting information by industrial policy,that is,industrial policy will reduce the role of accounting information in the debt contract;and for the market-oriented industry,the role of accounting information in the debt contract will be reduced.For enterprises with high degree of marketization and low degree of marketization,there is no significant difference in the effect of industrial policy on accounting information reduction in debt contracts.In this paper,new short-term loans and new growth-period loans are regressed respectively.Empirical research shows that the effect of industrial policy on accounting information reduction in debt contracts is more significant in short-term loans.From the perspective of the usefulness of debt contracts of accounting information,this paper reveals the mechanism of industrial policies affecting enterprises' access to bank loans,expands the research on the economic consequences of industrial policies,and enriches the research literature on the influencing factors of the usefulness of accounting information contracts.At the same time,this paper tries to find out the macroeconomic factors that affect the economic behavior of enterprises,and analyze the influence mechanism-government "direct intervention" or government "implicit guarantee".This distinction helps to clarify the problem of credit discrimination in industrial policy.