| Reliable financial information is the key to maintaining capital market order and ensuring the normal operation of the capital market.However,due to the imperfections of China's legal system and the lack of law enforcement,the protection of investors is relatively weak,which makes the fraud scandals of listed companies continue to occur,seriously jeopardizing the legitimate rights and interests of market participants.Therefore,how to improve the ability to identify and manage corporate fraud has been widely concerned by academics and practitioners.Since corporate fraud is essentially an opportunistic behavior in which management and major shareholders use information superiority and free disposal rights to satisfy private interests or evade supervision,as an important external governance mechanism,institutional investors with multiple advantages have the ability and willingness to supervise the company's operations.Relevant researches on institutional investors at home and abroad also show that the financial activities of institutional investors have a certain regulatory role and enhance the authenticity of the earnings information of listed companies.However,due to the availability of data,the previous literature did not pay attention to the way in which institutional investors learned about the real situation of listed companies and enhanced their information advantages,but simply used their shareholding characteristics to measure their governance effect.Since many times this indicator mainly reflects the shareholding situation on the balance sheet date,lacks for the portrayal of the dynamic governance behavior of institutional investors and makes it difficult to identify and test their specific channels of influence.Under the guidance of policies,research has gradually become a normal external governance mechanism for institutional investors in China to obtain private information and to communicate opinions and suggestions to listed companies.Therefore,this paper uses the 2013-2017 Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed company investor relationship record data,firstly expounds and analyzes the policy background and status quo of institutional investors' site visits,and then construct three indicators,including whether it is investigated by institutional investors,the frequency of institutional investors site visits during the year,and the number of institutional investors site visits during the year to measure the institutional investor site visits and build a logit regression model.From the information acquisition and information feedback role of the site visits,the theoretical analysis and empirical test have been conducted on whether institutional investors can obtain effective information and thus inhibit the corporate fraud.The research results show that institutional investor site visits can effectively curb corporate fraud,and because the heterogeneity of the organization will have a significant impact on the company's information transmission,the Seller institutional investor has a stronger inhibitory effect on the corporate fraud than the buyer institutional investor.The above conclusions are still robust after a series of robustness tests using instrumental variables to mitigate endogenous problems.Finally,based on the research conclusions,this paper proposes corresponding policy recommendations from the regulatory aspects of institutional investors and listed companies.The research contribution of this paper is based on the corporate fraud as the starting point,researching the governance effect of institutional investors based on research behavior rather than shareholding characteristics,supplementing the research of institutional investors' participation in corporate governance,and further enriching The related research on the economic consequences of direct communication between investors and management has also provided reference value for the regulatory authorities to further improve the information disclosure system of listed companies. |
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