With the rapid development of the industrial economy,continuously push forward the process of urbanization,industrial waste emissions lead to environmental damage,excessive waste of resources,more and more serious,international concerns about global climate change,the state environmental protection and ecological restoration attention to the needs of the market requirements for the degree of environmental protection products continue to force more and more enterprises to green transition.However,in the process of green practice,enterprises need to invest more money to purchase green raw materials,introduce green technologies or carry out other green innovations,which will reduce the enthusiasm of enterprises for green production.As the first person responsible for improving the environment and preventing pollution,the government needs to balance the relationship between economic development and environmental protection and establish a sustainable economic model.In order to promote more enterprises to actively develop green products,the government often formulates a series of preferential policies,such as subsidies,tax exemptions,and government priority procurement.The subsidy strategy is the most common and effective incentive method.Based on the above background,scholars have discussed the government subsidy strategy for decision-makers who are completely rational people.However,in many empirical studies and investigations,it is found that people’s decisions and theories made in actual transactions are very different,this is because bounded rationality is the basic feature of people’s behavior.In the actual decision-making process,green supply chain enterprises often have various behavioral preferences,and this behavioral preference will have a great impact on the final decision.This paper takes the above situation as the starting point,takes the green supply chain of irrational decision makers as the research object and introduces behavioral factors such as risk aversion and altruistic preference into the decision of green supply chain.Use the game theory research method to deeply explore the influence of government subsidies on their decision-making variables such as pricing and green innovation when policy makers are irrational.The research results show that:(1)When the manufacturer in the green supply chain is a preference for the company,the government needs to consider the altruistic preference coefficient of the manufacturer in order to obtain a better green effect.When the manufacturer’s altruistic preference coefficient is less than 1/2,the government can give a relatively high subsidy for research and development expenses.The higher the subsidy rate,the higher the enthusiasm of manufacturers to develop green products;When the manufacturer’s altruistic preference coefficient is higher than 1/2,the government should appropriately reduce the subsidy rate,and raising the subsidy rate will only be counterproductive;When the manufacturer prefers altruism,the increase in the government subsidy rate will inhibit the profit of the manufacturer.The government should consider the subsidy to ensure that the manufacturer can make profits.When the retailer is a preference for the company,in the case of the government subsidized manufacturer,the retailer should control the altruistic preference coefficient within 0~1/3 to ensure that the profit is not damaged.Form a win-win situation with manufacturers;To get a higher return on green products,the government needs to set a relatively high green product R&D subsidy rate.(2)When green supply chain enterprises have risk aversion behaviors,the game theory method is used to analyze the impact of government subsidy rate and supply chain member risk aversion attributes on green supply chain pricing strategies and product greenness levels.It is found that government subsidies always play a positive role in the supply chain under the centralized decision-making model and the risk-avoiding decentralized decision-making model,as the government subsidy rate increases,product greenness,wholesale price,retail price and supply chain related profits increase.When retailers are risk-averse,government subsidies do not always encourage manufacturers to increase product greenness.When the risk aversion coefficient of the retailer is within the range of(β/4σ2,β/2σ2),the product greenness,product wholesale price and product retail price determined by the risk neutral manufacturer will follow Declining the increase in the government subsidy rate;When the risk aversion coefficient of the retailer is within the range of(β/2σ2,3β/4σ2),the retail price of the product determined by the retailer is still negatively correlated with the government subsidy rate,but at this time Product greenness and product wholesale price will increase. |