Executive Compensation,Executive Stock Ownership And Corporate Innovation Input

This paper takes 10 listed companies with high demand for innovation investment in A-share companies from 2006 to 2017 as samples,and after controlling other factors,makes an empirical study on the impact of executive compensation and executive stock ownership on innovation investment.The results show that the improvement of executive compensation level and executive stock ownership level can effectively motivate executives to increase the company s innovation investment.Further research finds that the incentive effect of executive compensation and executive stock ownership on the enhancement of innovation input intensity is different among listed companies with different ownership attributes.Specifically,to improve the intensity of innovation investment,the incentive effect of executive compensation is not as good as that of private enterprises,but the incentive effect of executive shareholding is better than that of private enterprises.In contrast,the incentive effect of executive shareholding is not significant in private enterprises with no background of state-owned capital,while the incentive effect of executive compensation is better than that of state-owned enterprises.However,in no actual controller with decentralized ownership and lack of actual controllers,the incentive effect of executive compensation is not significant.In addition,because the increase of executive shareholding will lead to the defensive effect of executives.In order to further confirm the effect of this effect on executive compensation and the relationship between executive shareholding and corporate innovation investment,this paper also divides private enterprises with a large span of executive shareholding into five groups according to the level of executive shareholding.The empirical results show that the effect of executive shareholding will be effective.As the proportion of executive shareholding increases,it gradually weakens,and ultimately restrains the company s innovation investment.There are two other interesting findings in this paper when we study the impact of executive compensation and executive stock ownership on innovation investment.That is,the existence of large shareholders may inhibit the innovation investment of the company.The reason may be related to the risk aversion motivation of large shareholders because of asset concentration.At the same time,when the company' s asset returns are good,the executives will reduce the innovation investment of the company.Points are more obvious in No actual controller.