Research On Tunneling Behavior Of Large Shareholders Based On Corporate Governance

With the development of modem corporate governance mechanism,the core of principal-agent problem is no longer the conflict of interests between olners and managers,but the conflict of interests between large shareholders and small investors.Major shareholders have control over enterprises and can manipulate major business decisions,thus seriously encroaching on the interests of small and medium-sized investors through"tunneling" behavior.At present,in the capital market,the conflict of interests between large shareholders and small investors,as well as the research on the protection of small and medium investors have become the focus of attention,which has theoretical and practical significance.In China's capital market,large shareholders use various means to"tunneling" listed companies and seriously encroach on the interests of small and medium-sized investors,such as Monkey King,Top Software,Wu Liang Ye and other cases also confirm this phenomenon.China's Securities Regulatory Commission will focus on the protection of small and medium-sized investors in the current market supervision,but there are still large shareholders who ignore the supervision,and also use related party relations and other means to "tunneling" listed companies to seek their own private interests.Therefore,how to protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors from large shareholders is the key factor to ensure the sound operation and stable and healthy development of China's capital market.Based on the theory of corporate governance,large shareholders,tunneling and the protection of small and medium-sized investors,this paper takes Leshi as an example to analyze the negative impact of the reduction of large shareholders,the occupation of non-operating funds by related parties and the irregularities of guarantees by related parties on Leshi,and to explore the defects and loopholes of Leshi in corporate governance mechanism.The unreasonable ownership structure,the manipulation of the board of directors by the major shareholders,and the fictitious corporate governance problems of the board of supervisors and the internal control system give the major shareholders the opportunity to hollow out the listed companies.Subsequently,this paper attempts to explore the reasons why corporate governance deficiencies exist in Chinas capital market,and what measvures should be taken to effectively protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors and ensure the healthy and stable development of China's capital market in the face of large shareholders' tunneling behavior.Finally,this paper puts forward corresponding suggestions and measures,listed companies can set up "directors of small and medium investors,to strengthen the supervision and management of the behavior of large shareholders and board of directors;secondly,we can improve the effectiveness of the board of supervisors and internal control,truly play the role of internal supervision and governance of the board of supervisors and internal control.Finally,we can consider increasing the supervision of China's capital market.The punishment intensity of related illegal acts makes the major shareholders bear the burden of illegal costs.As we all know,the tunneling of listed companies by large shareholders will bring serious negative impact on the performance and image of listed companies,and also seriously damage the interests of small and medium investors.By analyzing the deficiencies in the governance of Leshi,this paper puts forward corresponding improvement measures and suggestions in order to enable listed companies to draw lessons from it,and to curb the tunneling behavior of major shareholders by improving the corporate governance status,so as to protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors from being infringed.