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The Policy Effectiveness Evaluation Of "pay Limitation Order"

Posted on:2020-03-22Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:T FengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330590471345Subject:Finance
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In 2017,the Fifth National Finance Conference was held,which clearly planned the development direction and objectives of the financial industry in the new era,and also reflected the increasingly important position of the financial industry in economic life.Financial listed companies occupy a huge volume in the financial market,and their reform and management are very important.The governance problems of financial listed companies are more complex than those of ordinary enterprises,and the social contradictions caused by their executive compensation problems are more obvious.Therefore,it is of great significance and vital importance to study the policy effect and market reaction of "salary restriction order" for financial listed companies.Based on this,this paper focuses on the policy effect of the state-owned enterprises' salary restriction order on executive compensation of financial listed companies in 2014.In order to better classify the listed financial state-owned enterprises,this paper further subdivides them into banking,securities,insurance and other industries,and studies the different market reaction and influence mechanism of different types of listed financial state-owned enterprises under the effect of "salary restriction order".At the same time,in order to measure the market reaction of policies,i.e.the impact on corporate value,most of the literatures choose the change of ROA as the measurement index of the market reaction.In order to better measure the market reaction,this paper chooses CAR as the measurement index of the market reaction.Firstly,it introduces the inspiration and practical value of this paper.Then it explains the institutional and theoretical background of this paper,and gives a more comprehensive introduction to the principal-agent theory,the optimal contract theory and the incomplete contract theory,as well as the management rights theory and incentive theory in corporate finance.Secondly,it further combs the existing domestic and foreign research results on the effect of the "pay limit order" policy,and summarizes the latest domestic and foreign literature on double difference method and event analysis method.It lays a theoretical foundation and model foundation for the writing of the paper.Then,in order to study whether the "salary limit order" of state-owned enterprises in 2014 really has an impact on financial listed enterprises,this paper uses the double difference method to make an empirical analysis.The results show that after the promulgation of the "salary limit order" in 2014,the salary of the listed state-owned enterprises in the financial sector has indeed declined,which shows that the "salary limit order" policy in 2014 has played a better policy effect.Then,using the event study method,this paper emphatically examines the impact of the "salary restriction order" on the market reaction of financial listed state-owned enterprises.Generally speaking,the financial listed state-owned enterprises have been adversely affected by the "salary limit order".Specifically,the event study method calculates the average cumulative abnormal returns of various classifications of financial listed state-owned enterprises.The average cumulative abnormal returns of banking industry is-1.292,the average cumulative abnormal returns of securities industry is-0.980,and the average cumulative abnormal returns of insurance and other industries is-0.251.The three values are significant at the level of 10%.By comparison,it can be seen that the three categories of banking industry bear the greatest negative effects in this "pay limit order".And then,the financial listed state-owned enterprises are divided into three industries to investigate their different market reactions in different industry environments.The results show that the coefficient is 0.062 after regression only with industry competitiveness(HHI)and several control variables without adding the other two variables,and the value is 0.092 when all other variables are added,which is significant at the level of 10%.At the same time,it also shows that the industry competitiveness and company value change in the same direction,that is,when the industry competitiveness is greater(the value of HHI is smaller),the cumulative abnormal returns of the company will be smaller,that is,the negative impact on company value will be greater.The Mktindex of the region is-0.936 in the regression formula,and-0.983 in the regression results of all variables,which is significant at the level of 10%.This shows that the higher degree of regional marketization makes greater negative impact of "salary limit order" on corporate value.The correlation coefficient of growth is-0.089 in the single regression formula,while it is-0.983 in the formula with all variables,and it is significant at the level of 10%.This shows that the higher growth rate of industry makes greater negative impact of "salary limit order" on corporate value.Finally,we also put forward some corresponding suggestions:Firstly,from this study,we can see that after the promulgation of the Central Management Enterprise Compensation System Reform Program in 2014,the executive compensation of financial listed state-owned enterprises has decreased significantly,while the executive compensation of financial listed non-state-owned enterprises has hardly been affected.And compared with the "salary restriction order" policy introduced in 2009,the policy in 2014 has obviously received better results.This shows that after the promulgation of the Eight Regulations,the transmission mechanism of salary control policy and the government's supervision of financial listed enterprises have been greatly strengthened.This shows that in the future work,we can continue to strengthen the anti-corruption efforts,which will greatly enhance the policy effect of the "salary limit order".Secondly,the "salary restriction order" has brought significant negative effects to the listed state-owned enterprises in the financial sector,among which the banking sector is the most serious.This tells us that salary reform can not be accomplished overnight,we should take the "salary limit" and company performance into account.We should actively encourage and implement compensation incentive measures linked to performance,such as shareholding intensity,and pay attention to protecting the work enthusiasm of executives of financial listed companies.It is also fully explained that measures of different progress and intensity should be taken according to the industry characteristics of the financial industry.Thirdly,through the classification study of various types of financial listed state-owned enterprises in different environments,it is found that the industry competitiveness and the company value change in the same direction.That is,when the industry competitiveness is greater(the value of HHI is smaller),the cumulative abnormal returns of the company will be smaller.That is,the negative impact on the company value will be greater.The higher the degree of regional marketization,the greater the negative impact of "salary restriction order" on corporate value.At the same time,the higher growth rate of the industry makes the greater negative impact of the "pay limit order" on the company's value.This requires that the formulation and implementation of the "salary limit order" should conform to the market law,adopt measures of varying degrees and speeds according to the growth rate,competitiveness and marketability of different industries,adhere to the classification reform of state-owned enterprises and precise supervision.
Keywords/Search Tags:Pay Limitation Order, Financial state-owned enterprises, Executive compensation, Market reaction
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