The Manipulation Behavior Of Major Shareholders Participating In The Directional Issuance And Its Market Reaction

In recent years,directional issuance has become a frequent financing activity in China's stock market.The financing scale of directional issuance has even exceeded the scale of IPO in the same period,and its importance to China's capital market can be seen.However,China's stock market also generally has the problem of excessive concentration of large shareholders of the company,which leads to the absolute control of the major shareholders,and can manipulate the company's management and management affairs at will,including directional issuance.When major shareholders participate in directional issuances,they can lower the issue price and increase the issuance scale and subscription ratio to obtain more private income for themselves,and also harm the interests of the company and minority shareholders.On the other hand,major shareholders can also increase the issuing price to help the company to get more money to support the company's development.Therefore,these manipulations not only reflect the "tunneling effect" of the major shareholder in the company,but also reflect its "interest synergy effect" with the company.The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the behavioral differences between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprise major shareholders in encroaching on the company's interests through the directional issuance of controlling shareholders,and to explore the market's attitude towards the two types of enterprises.Specifically,it is divided into four questions: Does the nature of corporate property rights affect the “tunneling effect” of major shareholders? Does the nature of property rights affect the “interest synergy effect” between major shareholders and the company? Does the nature of property rights affect the balance of other shareholders' "tunneling effect" on major shareholders? Does the nature of property rights affect the market reaction of major shareholder subscription behavior? For the above problems,we use the discount rate to measure the degree of damage to the company's interests,comprehensively use the discount rate and the issuance scale to measure the degree of damage to the interests of small and medium shareholders,measure the market reaction using the short-term yield between the announcement date.In order to study the above problems,we divided the sample into state-owned enterprise groups and non-state-owned enterprise groups.First,we used the discount rate to measure the degree of damage to the company's interests,and examined the impact of the difference of the shareholding ratios between the directional issuance and the shareholding ratio of major shareholders on it.Then we use the discount rate and the size of the issuance to comprehensively measure the degree of damage to the interests of small shareholders,and examine the impact of equity concentration on it.Finally,we examine the impact of the participation of major shareholders on the company's stock price.The empirical results of this paper are as follows:(1)Non-state-owned enterprises have obvious “tunneling effect”,while state-owned enterprises do not have obvious “tunneling effect”.(2)The major shareholders of non-state-owned enterprises and the company showed obvious “interest synergy effects”,while stateowned enterprises did not show it.(3)The balance of power of non-state-owned enterprises can effectively suppress the “tunneling effect”,while the performance of state-owned enterprises' equity checks and balances is not obvious.(4)Investors are more optimistic about the investment behavior of large shareholders of non-stateowned enterprises.Through empirical research,we find that when the major shareholders of non-state-owned enterprises purchase shares of the company,the price of the company's stock will rise significantly,and when the major shareholder of the state-owned enterprise purchases the company's shares,the market has no obvious abnormal reaction.