Research On The Influence Of Shareholder Coordination On Stock Price Informativeness

The influence of institutional investors on the stock price informativeness is one of the research hotspots in recent years.Different from the literatures about the trading behavior and shareholding ratio of institutional investors in the past,the paper studies the coordination of institutional shareholders,that is,the geographical proximity of institutional investors,improving the quality of corporate information disclosure and promoting the stock price to reflect more characteristic information.The reason lies in the paper arguing that shareholder coordination can enhance the company's external supervision,while regulated managers are more likely to disclose timely and high-quality information to the public.As a result,uninformed investors are attracted by credible public information and are more likely to hold equity,thus facilitating the integration of company traits into stock prices.At the same time,as the marginal revenue of trading with uninformed investors increases,informed investors are more motivated to collect company trait information,thereby further promoting the stock price informativeness.In order to measure the degree of coordination of the company's institutional shareholders,the paper calculates the average geographical distance weighted by institutional investors' shareholding ratio as the proxy indicator.The agent is based on the fact that when the potential connections between institutional investors become closer,they are more likely to coordinate their regulatory role for the company.For the stock price informativeness,the paper is based on a large number of previous research results,and chooses the company's stock price heterogeneity fluctuation index based on the Fama-French three-factor model.In the empirical part,the regression of the basic multivariate linear model of panel data is first carried out.The results show that there is a positive correlation between shareholder coordination and stock price informativeness.Further sample classification regression was carried out to study the effects of coordination effects of different types of institutional investors on stock price informativeness.The results show that the shareholder coordination of independent and long-term institutional investors has significant positive influence on the company's stock price informativeness.Subsequent research on whether there is a substitution effect between shareholder coordination and other governance mechanisms that have been shown to be related to stock price informativeness.The results show that the shareholder coordination has a substitution effect on the corporate governance factors that promote the stock price informativeness,such as the concentration of large shareholders,the proportion of independent directors,and the diversity of the board of directors.Then,the paper demonstrates the causal relationship between shareholder coordination and stock price informativenss through transformation variables,and the results prove that there is a one-way influence relationship between them.Then,the paper uses the differential generalized moment estimation method to analyze the robustness,which also supports the previous research results.Finally,the paper introduces the management earnings forecast frequency as a way for the company's information disclosure variables to influence the shareholder's coordination on the stock price informativeness.The results show that there is a partial mediation effect,that is,the part of the shareholder's coordination effect on the stock price informativeness is through the way of improving the company's information disclosure.In summary,the paper found that,in terms of China's securities market,the coordination between institutional shareholders has a significant positive impact on the stock price informativeness,especially independent or long-term institutional investors.At the same time,shareholder coordination has a substitution effect on other corporate governance mechanisms,which means that shareholder coordination is better for companies with weaker governance mechanisms to increase stock price informativeness.In addition,the paper also found that the shareholder coordination partly impacts on the stock price informativeness by improving the quality of corporate information disclosure.In general,these findings provide a basis for China to strengthen the attention of institutional investors and improve the structure of institutional investors,and also provide a new research perspective to improve the efficiency of China's securities market.