A Case Study Of Anti-malware Takeover Of Listed Companies In China

With the gradual improvement of the reform of split share structure,the securities market of our country has also experienced a world-shaking reform,which is mainly manifested in the regulation methods of the securities market,the adjustment of the structure of the securities market and so on at the legal level.To a certain extent,this reform has also become an important factor affecting the hostile takeover and anti-hostile takeover of listed companies in China.Based on theory,the relationship between hostile takeover and anti-hostile takeover is mutual influence and restriction.However,the theoretical research on anti-hostile takeover strategy in China is too single.Based on the reality,the hostile takeover of listed companies in China has not been supported on a large scale for the time being,but this does not mean that the hostile takeover can be accepted by the market.The occurrence of hostile takeover will not only have a negative impact on the operation of the acquired enterprise,but also hinder the healthy development of the market economy.This paper selects Vanke Baoneng case as the research entity,through the methods of literature analysis and inductive analysis,systematically analyzes the case of Baoneng hostile acquisition of Vanke,combining the financial data before and after the acquisition and the excess accumulated income.It also explains the influence of malignant takeover on the acquired enterprise and the acquired enterprise,and probes into the causes and risks of the malignant takeover.And from this incident summed up the inspiration to enterprises,regulators and small and medium-sized shareholders,such as enterprise level,we should establish anti-hostile takeover early warning tracking mechanism,set up a reasonable ownership structure,optimize the allocation of corporate control rights,and so on;The regulatory body should establish and perfect the information disclosure mechanism of company acquisition,construct and perfect the multi-level market cooperative supervision system,and protect the right to know and the basic rights and interests of the minority shareholders.Through the analysis of Vanke Baoneng case,on the one hand,it provides warning and reference for the management and development of other listed companies,so that listed enterprises can identify hostile acquisitions ahead of time,and actively take anti-hostile takeover strategy to prevent and resist.On the other hand,it is to build a more perfect market economic order and provide a more healthy development environment for the development of Chinese enterprises.