Research On China's Shadow Bank Supervision Arbitrage Behavior

In recent years,China's regulatory authorities have frequently issued restrictions on shadow banking,but in fact,the effect of financial supervision is not very good,and the scale of shadow banking credit in China is getting higher and higher.The reason for this is that commercial Banks themselves continue to exploit policy loopholes for business innovation,so as to avoid supervision and obtain excess profits.Therefore,the purpose of this paper is to gain insight into the current situation and operation mode of China's shadow banking,clarify the arbitrage logic of China's shadow banking,and provide reference for regulatory authorities to formulate more targeted regulatory policies.Combined with the theoretical research basis of relevant literature at home and abroad,this paper summarizes three characteristics of shadow banking in China that distinguish it from western countries:First,take the commercial bank as the leading;Second,most of the money comes from bank deposits;Third,financing is mainly provided to residents and enterprises through retail channels.At the same time,the shadow banking in China is clearly defined by combining these three characteristics: it refers to the credit intermediary institutions and business activities that have the characteristics of "quasi-banks" and play the role of debt financing and liquidity conversion,but are separated from the supervision of core indicators in Basel III.In the chapter of theoretical research,this paper selects the perspective of regulatory arbitrage of commercial Banks to deeply analyze the causes and operation modes of shadow banking in China,and on this basis,analyzes the specific path of regulatory arbitrage of Chinese commercial Banks.In the chapter of empirical research,firstly,this paper systematically calculates the scale of shadow banking based on the definition of shadow banking,and conducts empirical tests on the theoretical assumptions of regulatory arbitrage.The results show that when there is financial supervision,the deviation between the credit scale of shadow Banks and the growth rate of traditional credit scale of commercial Banks will increase,which verifies the effectiveness of regulatory arbitrage theory.Secondly,in order to further study the relationship between Banks' regulatory arbitrage behavior and their asset structure changes,this paper selected the core capital adequacy ratio of 18 representative commercial Banks as an important indicator to measure the regulatory arbitrage behavior of commercial Banks.The results show that the regulatory arbitrage behavior of commercial Banks is microcosmic reflected in the balance sheet and has a specific relationship with the asset structure.In addition,due to the differences between state-owned Banks and non-state-owned Banks in terms of the size and quality of assets,they are not completely consistent with the change direction of some assets when conducting regulatory arbitrage.Finally,based on the research results of regulatory arbitrage behavior of commercial Banks,this paper provides corresponding Suggestions from aspects of regulatory direction and focus.Most of the research results of scholars at home and abroad are analyzed from the macroeconomic perspective of shadow banking,such as monetary policy and financial system stability.Therefore,this paper makes innovations in two aspects: first,based on the existing researches of scholars,it reveals the fundamental causes and operation mechanism of shadow banking from the perspective of regulatory arbitrage,which is conducive to the objective understanding of "chinese-style" shadow banking;Second,in order to objectively demonstrate the regulatory arbitrage behavior of commercial Banks,this paper conducts research from the macro and micro perspectives.At the macro level,the credit scale of commercial Banks is distinguished from that of shadow Banks,so as to study the similarities and differences of financial supervision on them.At the micro level,from the perspective of the relationship between regulatory arbitrage behavior of commercial Banks and the change of asset structure,this paper attempts to further explain the impact of regulatory arbitrage behavior of commercial Banks on the financial indicators in their balance sheets through quantitative analysis,which further enriches the research on regulatory arbitrage and shadow banking.