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Research On The Effect Of Minority Shareholders' Participation In Corporate Governance

Posted on:2020-11-07Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y L ChengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330590493398Subject:Financial management
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From the practice of corporate governance in China,small and medium-sized shareholders face the problem of dual agency,and their interests are frequently infringed.Under the influence of information asymmetry and rational "economic man",managers are prone to incumbent on-the-job consumption or lazy work.Major shareholders often use their advantages of equity and information to convey benefits through related party transactions,dividend distribution and other means.In some cases,they even conspire to empty listed companies,and the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders are often neglected and occupied.Land.Although there are many internal and external governance mechanisms that restrict the behavior of management and large shareholders,their governance effect is limited.Because of information asymmetry,high supervision cost and lack of professional knowledge,minority shareholders often choose to express their attitudes by "voting with feet".Therefore,small and medium-sized shareholders are called "rational indifferent" or "hitchhiker" by many scholars.However,from a fundamental point of view,small and medium-sized shareholders,as the biggest losers of the two types of agency problems,have the greatest endogenous incentives to protect their rights and interests.At the same time,with the application of online voting,cumulative voting and the change of investment concept of small and medium-sized shareholders,the cost of their participation in corporate governance has been reduced and their enthusiasm has been stimulated.More and more small and medium-sized shareholders are eager to participate in and actively participate in corporate governance.Some scholars have affirmed the role of small and medium-sized shareholders' participation in corporate governance in improving corporate performance and value.Small and medium-sized shareholders' participation in corporate governance will involve management,major shareholders and small and medium shareholders' own tripartite stakeholders.Then,what impact will their participation in corporate governance have on the three parties? Will the corresponding effects be affected by the ownership structure of the company?In order to answer the above two questions,this paper combs the relevant research results,based on the formal participation mechanism of voting right exercise in shareholders' general meeting,takes the listed companies of Shenzhen A-share market in 2012-2016 as the research sample,uses the online voting rate of shareholders' general meeting of listed companies to measure the participation degree of small and medium shareholders in corporate governance,and explores the agency cost of small and medium shareholders' participation in corporate governance to management.The impact of large shareholders' related party transactions and small and medium shareholders' earnings rights is analyzed,and the differences between high and low equity concentration companies are analyzed.As far as the specific research content is concerned,this paper first reviews and summarizes the research results at home and abroad,then analyses the basic theory and the exercise mechanism of small and medium-sized shareholders involved in the topic,then puts forward the research hypothesis and constructs the model on the basis of literature support and theoretical analysis,then tests the research hypothesis and analyses the empirical results,finally summarizes the research conclusions and puts forward the policy.Policy recommendations.The results of normative analysis and empirical test show that the participation of small and medium-sized shareholders in corporate governance can reduce the agency cost of management and the related transaction level of large shareholders,reduce the possibility of abnormal dividends of listed companies,and safeguard the earning rights of small and medium-sized shareholders;while the degree of ownership concentration will affect the exertion of three effects,and the corresponding effects in companies with low degree of ownership concentration.It will be more significant.This paper affirms the governance role of minority shareholders by studying the effect of minority shareholders 'participation in corporate governance,and supplements relevant research.It is also of great significance to enrich the theory of investor protection,optimize corporate governance and promote the improvement of relevant legal system.The main contributions of this paper are as follows: firstly,it deepens the research on the participation of small and medium-sized shareholders in corporate governance.This paper comprehensively discusses the governance effect from three perspectives of management,major shareholders and small and medium-sized shareholders,and studies the impact of ownership concentration on the three effects.Secondly,it tests the governance role of small and medium-sized shareholders from the perspective of shareholders' voting,affirms the shareholders' meeting and network.The value of online voting system,using the network voting rate collected by hand,can directly and accurately measure the participation degree of small and medium shareholders in corporate governance.Finally,it provides a theoretical basis for enterprises to attach importance to the participation of small and medium shareholders and improve the corresponding system design by supervising departments.This paper affirms the positive role of small and medium shareholders' participation behavior and the mechanism of shareholders' meeting for enterprises.It provides empirical evidence for the regulatory departments to formulate policies and systems conducive to improving the participation of small and medium-sized shareholders in corporate governance.
Keywords/Search Tags:Minority shareholders participating in corporate governance, Agency cost, Related party transaction, Abnormal cash dividend
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