Research On The Impact Of Controlling Shareholder's Shareholding Pledge On Corporate Value

In recent years,with the rapid development of social economy,more and more capital operations have emerged in commercial activities.As a new type of financing,shareholding pledge has the advantages of low cost,simple operation,less restrictive conditions and strong liquidity.Become a financing tool for corporate preferences.However,behind the rapid development of shareholding pledge,listed companies have frequent problems due to pledge behavior.The high pledge rate of the company's sensitivity to stock price fluctuations makes it easy for companies to face the risk of forced liquidation.Especially because most of the listed companies in China have a high degree of equity concentration,the shareholding pledge of the controlling shareholder is often more likely to affect the entire listed company.Therefore,studying the impact of controlling shareholders' shareholding pledge on company value is of great significance to the effective governance and operation of the company and the stable and sustainable development of the capital market.In this paper,the combination of theoretical analysis and case analysis is used to study the impact of shareholding pledge on company value.Firstly,it reviews the research literature of domestic and foreign scholars on the motivation and risk of equity pledge,the evaluation method of company value and the influencing factors,the relationship between shareholding pledge and company value.Secondly,based on principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,signal transmission theory The theory of private interest in control,combined with the shareholding pledge behavior of the controlling shareholder,theoretically analyzes the mechanism and influence path of the controlling shareholder's shareholding pledge on the company's value;on the basis of this,combined with the case of the shareholding pledge of the controlling shareholder of Yinyi Shares,based on the market value The management path uses the event research method to analyze the short-term and long-term effects before and after the shareholding pledge;based on the separation path of the two rights,analyzes the degree of separation of the two rights before and after the company's shareholding pledge;based on the enterprise innovation path,analyzes the R&D intensity of the company's shareholding pledge,from three The path analyzes the impact of shareholding pledge on the value of listed companies;finally,the value of the company is measured by ROE and Tobin's Q,and the value of the company after the pledge of the listed company's shareholding is quantitatively analyzed.The study found that:(1)The controlling shareholder's shareholding pledge will lead to the decline of the company's market value and reduce the company's value;(2)The controlling shareholder's shareholding pledge will lead to the intensification of the separation of the two rights of the enterprise and strengthen the encroachment effect,thus having a negative impact on the company's value;(3)The controlling shareholder's shareholding pledge will cause the company to suppress innovative behavior and enable the company to reduce the opportunity to enhance its value.According to the research conclusions,this paper puts forward suggestions from the internal governance level of the company and the external supervision level to prevent the risk that the controlling shareholder's shareholding pledge will adversely affect the company's value.