Quality Supervision Model Research Oflogistics Service Supply Chain

With the development and expansion of the service economy and the rapid application of the Internet in industrial structure,China's logistics industry has developed rapidly and its demand has continued to expand.Currently,The study of logistics service supply chain not only occupies a considerable proportion in the research of service supply chain,but also conforms to the general requirements.However,the application of logistics service supply chain is relatively late in China due to the restrict of some factors.There is a lack of reasonable and effective ince ntive mechanisms among the various entities in the supply chain,which has hindered the development of this service model to a certain extent in China so that it has not been effective.Therefore,based on the contractual relationship between the logistics service integrator and the logistics service provider,this paper sets the logistics service integrator as the principal,the logistics service provider as the agent.Through the principal-agent theory,the issue of contractual coordination between the parties is to increase the cooperation and coordination level of the supply chain,then ensure the healthy and sustainable development of the logistics service supply chain.First of all,this paper reviews the research status,summarizes the relevant hot issues,and reviews different research hotspots of logistics service supply chain in recent years.Including the definition of logistics service supply chain,and how to increase the level of efforts of the agents and to enhance the quality of the services for integrators.Through summarizing the research contents of the predecessors,it is found that the scholars have not formed a scientific theoretical system for the study of the quality supervision of the logistics service supply chain,and while studying on how to design the incentive mechanism,few scholars have taken the characteristics of the supply chain into account.This paper will be further improved in this regard.Secondly,using the principal-agent theory,the participants in the logistics service supply chain are abstracted,the principal-agent relationship is analyzed,the objectives of each subject are summarized,and the possibility of establishing the relevant model using principal-agent theory is analyzed.Starting from the whole process o f logistics service operation,it analyzes the efficiency goals of logistics service integrators and downstream logistics service providers that are upstream of the supply chain and the principal-agent relationship between integrators and service providers.Due to the existence of the principal-agent relationship,there is information asymmetry between the integrator and the provider,and then the multi-agent problem and the two-way moral hazard problem during the abstraction process of the model are analyzed.And consider the impact of logistics service providers and logistics customers on the overall performance feedback of logistics services on the benefits of each member of the supply chain,and how it affects the incentive effect.Thirdly,build a principal-agent model of logistics service supply chain.Because integrators integrate logistics services of integrated providers and provide more professional services to customers,so this article will logistics services integrator as the contracts of the principal,and providers as a representative of contracts,and treats providers as agents of contract contracts and services,and feedbacks the objective performance feedback of service providers and the subjective performance of logistics customers to their effect on the corresponding providers.Influence this scenario to join the principal-agent model.The main conclusions are as follows: First,the key parameters affecting the contract design in the logistics service supply chain will increase or decrease with each element,such as the level of competence of logistics service integrators and logistics service providers,along with their output conversion factors and What happens to the change of cost coefficient,the optimal incentive payment of logistics service integrator decreases with the increase of the fierce competition between multi-service providers in the supply chain;second,after adding the dual performance feedback model in the principal-agent model,the incentive contract designed will make logistics service integrators work harder to provide logistics services to ensure the quality of logistics services,and the integrator's fixed to the provider.Payment and income sharing factors also have a tendency to rise.The level of competitiveness among logistics service providers will also be taken into account in contractual design.Finally,through the analysis of the results obtained by the model,combined with the current development of the logistics service supply chain in China,This paper proposes practical and effective suggestions on the development of logistics service supply chain and measures for quality improvement of service supply chain from three levels: logistics customer,logistics service integrator and logistics service provider.This article abstracts and parameterizes the real environment,constructs the incentive contract model of logistics service supply chain considering double performance feedback,and broadens the scope of application of principal-agent theory in theoretical research.And to provide some theoretical basis and reference for how to improve the quality of logistics service from the contract design level.