Research On Information Disclosure Of Internet Platform

In recent years,online retail has gained rapid development,but the lack of information disclosure has harmed the legitimate rights and interests of consumers.Online retail platform as a carrier of online transactions is the carrier and disseminator of information,but for now,many platforms have the problem of insufficient information disclosure.The research object of this article is the online retail platform.The article will use the two-sided market theory to study the information disclosure and pricing of the online retail platform.It not only broadens the two-sided market theory to new fields of application but also provides a theoretical basis for the sustainable development of the platform.Based on the actual situation of the online retail market,this paper analyzes the information predicament faced by buyers in the process of online shopping,puts forward the obligation of information disclosure on the online retail platform and evaluates its existing disclosure behavior.The study found that online buyers face the dilemma of limited information channels,difficult information judgment and insufficient information exchange.In the absence of legal constraints and the lack of platform awareness,there are some problems such as false disclosure,incomplete disclosure,untimely disclosure and inappropriate method.Secondly,this paper focuses on the characteristics of information disclosure of online retail platform,and uses the two-sided market theory to build a platform equilibrium pricing model under monopoly and competitive conditions respectively.The research shows that the information disclosure level and the change of pricing strategy can influence the seller's platform access strategy.Under monopoly conditions,on an online retail platform that connects the seller and the buyer with the objective of maximizing profit,as long as there is a low-quality seller access to the platform,the optimal pricing of the platform to the buyer increases with the improvement of the level of information disclosure.The opposite is true only if only high-quality sellers access the platform.The optimal pricing of the two types of sellers is not affected by the level of information disclosure.Out of profit maximization,the platform will choose to mix the pricing of equilibrium and ambiguous disclosure of information.Under the conditions of competition,the pricing and profit of platforms with high levels of information disclosure are higher than the lower ones.With the narrowing of the information disclosure gap between the two,the pricing and profit of platforms with high levels of information disclosure have dropped while the low ones have increased.Based on the above analysis and the existing research,this paper puts forward suggestions from two aspects: platform operation and government supervision.At last,it summarizes the shortcomings of this article and looks forward to the future research direction.We can consider the impact of multiple factors on the equilibrium results,empirical research on the information disclosure of online retail platforms,or research on market regulation policies.