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Institutional Investor Heterogeneity,Management Governance And Bond Financing Costs

Posted on:2020-11-11Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:R X JiangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330590993402Subject:Financial management
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?.Background and purposeDebt financing is a major way of financing for various enterprises at present,which has the functions of tax shield,financial leverage,optimization of capital structure,etc.At present,under the background of " deleveraging",the cost of debt financing is too high,causing many enterprises to fall into a liquidity dilemma.Therefore,many enterprises prefer equity financing,but this violates the principle of priority financing,so reducing the cost of debt financing becomes especially important.This paper focuses on the bond financing cost among the debt financing costs.With the continuous development of China's capital market,the scale of institutional investors continues to expand and has evolved into one of the indispensable investment groups in the capital market.In order to enliven the capital market and conform to the development goal of the international situation,China Securities Regulatory Commission put forward " unconventional development of institutional investors" in 2000.Some scholars believe that the investment mode and behavior adopted by institutional investors are more standardized,which can effectively improve the corporate governance environment,improve the management level of senior executives and play a strong supervisory role,thus contributing to the improvement of the corporate management system and the effectiveness of internal control.Another part of scholars believe that: compared with foreign countries,China's institutional investors started late and are still immature in development.Most institutional investors are short-term investments,which focus on the short-term benefits of the company and vote with their feet when the company is in low operating conditions.Moreover,when a stock is held by multiple institutions,many institutions may have the phenomenon of " free riding" and are unwilling to bear a series of costsincurred in stock selection,thus causing these institutional investors not to participate deeply in the process of improving management governance,which is not conducive to improving the effectiveness of internal control.At the same time,since the SOX Act was promulgated in 2002,the construction of corporate governance has become the top priority of corporate governance reform and has attracted a large number of scholars to study it.The main research directions are as follows: First,study the influencing factors of corporate governance,mainly including corporate economic characteristics,corporate governance structure and senior management characteristics;The second is the study of the economic consequences of corporate governance,such as the impact of corporate governance on the quality of accounting information,the impact on auditor behavior,etc.Among them,some scholars have found that with the improvement of management governance,debt financing constraints can be eased.Combined with the role of institutional investors in management governance,we can learn that there may also be a correlation between institutional investors and bond financing costs.This paper selects the bond financing cost among the debt financing costs,and classifies them according to the heterogeneity of institutional investors,and discusses the influence of various institutional investors on bond financing costs and the role of management governance in the process of institutional investors' influence on bond financing costs.?.Main ideas and contentThis paper selects the data of bonds of listed companies from 2009 to 2016 as samples,obtains the bond financing costs by manual and software processing,and studies the relationship among institutional investor shareholding,management governance and bond financing costs.The full text is divided into six chapters.The specific content of each chapter is arranged as follows:The first chapter is introduction: it mainly introduces the research background,purpose,methods,ideas,logical structure and main contributions of this paper.First of all,it briefly expounds the research background of institutional investor shareholding,management governance and bond financing cost.Then the purpose,method,thinking and logical structure adopted by the research institute are elaborated.Finally,the contribution of this paper is shown.The second chapter is literature review: combining with domestic and foreign literature,it is mainly summarized from three aspects.1.The interrelation among the shareholding ratio of institutional investors,management governance and bond financing costs;2.Differences in the impact of heterogeneity of institutional investors on bond financing costs.According to different classification criteria,institutional investors are divided into pressure resistant and pressure sensitive types,and centralized and decentralized holdings.3.Literature review on the intermediary role of management governance.Analysis of previous research results,pointing out the research areas to be improved,in order to lead to the scope and depth of this study.The third chapter is theoretical analysis: Firstly,it defines the concept of institutional investor holding,management governance and bond financing cost.After reviewing the principal-agent theory,the information asymmetry theory,the internal control theory and the signal transmission theory,combing the writing logic of this article with the theory,to lay the foundation for the later research and design.Chapter ? Research and Design: Firstly,three basic assumptions are formulated in combination with the previous description.After that,the empirical data of listed bonds and stock companies issued in Shanghai and Shenzhen from2009 to 2016 are selected,Combined with relevant assumptions,the explained variables,explained variables and control variables are set to establish a multiple regression model.Chapter ? Empirical Results and Analysis: Firstly,descriptive statistics and correlation analysis are carried out on the sample data.And using the previously designed model and data,respectively prove the research hypothesis.Finally,the explained variables are replaced for robustness test,and the empirical analysis is finished.Chapter ? Research Conclusions,Limitations and SuggestionsAccording to the regression results,the research conclusions of this paper are drawn,the limitations of this paper in designing and collecting data are analyzed and put forward,and relevant suggestions are put forward based on the previous work.?.Conclusions and main contributionsThe results of this study show: 1.Compared with pressure-sensitive institutional investors,the higher the shareholding ratio of pressure-resistant institutional investors,the more obvious the reduction in bond financing costs;Compared with non-centralized institutional investors,the higher the shareholding ratio of centralized institutional investors,the more obvious the reduction in bond financing costs.2.Management governance plays an intermediary role in the impact of pressure-resistant institutional investors with centralized shareholding on bond financing costs.The main contributions of this paper are as follows:1.It enriches the refining process of institutional investors' negative impact on bond financing cost,provides a new theoretical basis for non-state-owned listed companies to reduce bond financing cost,and lays a foundation for scholars to study the mechanism of institutional investors' impact on bond financing cost process.2.It reveals the influence mechanism of institutional investors' negative influence on bond financing cost,enriches the reaction process of institutional investors' negative influence on bond financing cost,and inspires scholars to explore other influence paths.
Keywords/Search Tags:institutional investors, Management governance, intermediary role, bond financing cost
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