Research On Equity Incentive Effect Of Listed Companies

Since the 1990 s,China has carried out the practice of equity incentives.The relevant legal systems have been gradually established and matured.It is affirmed in policy that equity incentives are conducive to the formation of capital owners and workers' interests and improve the positive effects of corporate governance mechanisms.However,in practice,many scholars have questioned the validity of equity incentives.They believe that equity incentives are no longer incentive arrangements,but rather tools for management power rent-seeking.As a kind of implicit incentive mechanism,manager market competition can restrain the opportunistic behavior of management to a certain extent,and form a “cooperative incentive effect” with the equity incentive mechanism.The differences in the background of China's corporate system make different types of enterprise managers have different internal control powers and are subject to different levels of external competition.Eventually,the equity incentive effect may vary depending on the nature of the enterprise.The research on the effectiveness of equity incentives has always directly linked equity incentives to company performance.This paper believes that the improvement of corporate performance is not the direct result of equity incentives.The premise of performance improvement is the enthusiasm of management,that is,management.Effort level.The level of management effort plays a mediating role between equity incentives and corporate performance,ignoring the important intermediary factors of management effort level,and the research conclusions are often pseudorelated.On the one hand,this paper introduces the intermediary factor of “management effort level” between equity incentives and company performance,and theoretically explains the effectiveness of equity incentives;on the other hand,based on the differences in the nature of property rights of Chinese enterprises,From the two aspects of managerial power and manager market competition,the paper discusses the influence of the difference of property rights on the effectiveness of equity incentives.This paper takes the listed companies with equity incentives in the Shanghai-Shenzhen A-shares from 2006 to 2017 as the research object,and establishes a structural equation model based on the differences in property rights.The multi-group analysis is carried out,and the mediation effect is carried out by using the bootstrap method and the coefficient product distribution method.test.Finally,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)The equity incentives of private enterprises in China are effective,the equity incentives can significantly improve the level of managerial efforts,and the level of managerial efforts completely mediates the relationship between equity incentives and corporate performance,whether Both earnings management and real earnings management have no significant mediating effects.(2)The equity incentives of state-owned enterprises in China are ineffective.Equity incentives cannot improve the level of managerial efforts.The level of managerial efforts has no significant mediating effect between equity incentives and corporate performance.Instead,real earnings management has a complete mediating effect..(3)Regardless of whether it is a state-owned enterprise or a private enterprise,after eliminating the influence of earnings management,equity incentives can significantly promote the hard work of managers,and the managerial efforts have a full intermediary role.Based on this,this paper proposes to form a healthy and effective power balance mechanism,open the manager market and improve the equity incentive design.This paper theoretically analyzes the effectiveness of equity incentives in the intermediary role of management efforts,further improves the research mechanism of equity incentive effects,and from the perspective of corporate managers on the differences in equity incentive effects under different property rights.It provides theoretical explanations and provides suggestions for the improvement of equity incentives for enterprises with different property rights in China,which has important theoretical and practical guiding significance.