Vertical Interlocks Of Executives And Corporate Debt Financing Costs

From a practical point of view,the various regulatory agencies have different attitudes toward the role of vertical concurrent executives in corporate governance due to various factors.The China Securities Regulatory Commission has issued documents restricting the senior executives of the company from concurrently,including detailed provisions such as ―three separates‖ and ―five separates‖.The Chinese Securities and Futures Commission’s vigilance toward vertical concurrent executives is obvious.Vertically concurrent executives may be the channel for large shareholders to gain control of private benefits,thus playing a negative role in corporate governance.However,the state-owned asset management department believes that vertical concurrent executives can promote the realization of the goal of maximizing the value-added and value-added of state-owned assets.In the process of reform,the state-owned enterprises that are mainly supported by them will appoint the top leaders of listed companies by senior managers of the group companies.Serve as.The SASAC’s support attitude towards vertical concurrent executives is self-evident,that is,vertical concurrent executives may be a means for major shareholders to strengthen effective supervision of company management,thus showing a positive governance role.Relevant literatures mainly include the accounting information quality,enterprise value and enterprise risk commitment,but the research conclusions are different.Some scholars have found that the positive governance role of vertical concurrent executives helps to improve the quality of accounting information and risk-taking of enterprises,but other scholars have found that the negative role of vertical concurrent executives will significantly reduce corporate value.The practical and theoretical circles have a lot of controversy about the positive and negative effects played by vertical concurrent executives.So what role does vertical concurrent executives play? This paper will analyze the role of vertical concurrent executives in corporate finance activities to better test the role of vertical concurrent executives in corporate governance.This paper selects the data samples of Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2017.After controlling the influencing factors of debt financing costs,the multiple regression model is used to empirically test the impact of vertical concurrent executives on corporate debt financing costs.The specific division of the chairman of the board of directors as the impact of different concurrent job categories on debt financing this paper are in three ways to make the research conclusions more reliable.The study found that: First,vertical concurrent executives are positively related to corporate debt financing costs.It indicates that the vertical concurrently serves as the means for the major shareholder to obtain the private benefits of control,and there is a motive for ―short-cutting‖ listed companies.Secondly,after subdividing the concurrent job categories,it is found that the vertical concurrently serving as the senior executive of the general manager has a stronger influence on the corporate debt financing costs.From the perspective of debt financing costs,this paper further explores the economic consequences of vertical concurrently serving as executives to develop and innovate related research on vertical concurrent senior management.At the same time,this paper provides good empirical evidence for the pros and cons of vertical concurrent executives.The research in this paper also provides new ideas for the improvement of corporate governance mechanism.Therefore,the research in this paper has certain theoretical and practical significance.