Research On The Structure Reform Of Listed State-owned Enterprises

Under the new normal economy,perfecting corporate governance is the fundamental way for enterprises to meet the challenge of new economic situation.As an important pillar of the national economy,the reform of central enterprises has always been the core and key of the whole economic system reform.At the end of 2016,there are 106 central enterprises,which almost cover all of China's current industrial categories,and its total assets exceed 68 trillion yuan,accounting for half of the state-owned enterprise total asset.Like other state-owned enterprises,some of the problems of state with a total of natural system,corporate governance exists many defects,such as the unreasonable equity structure,the board of directors system has become a mere formality,the lack of effective incentive mechanism,employee compensation,and selection.In this paper,the above problems are discussed in the following aspects:First of all,the paper introduces the related theories of central enterprise governance,and reviews the literature on state-owned enterprises and corporate governance structures.Secondly,this paper introduces the evolution and the problems of the governance of state-owned enterprises.And it analyzes the present situation of the listed central enterprise governance structure from four aspects,such as ownership structure,board of directors,the incentive mechanism,and personnel quality.Also it selects related data of 2011-2015 China's listed state-owned enterprises manufacturing as sample,and does Descriptive statistical analysis.Then,the influence factors of the reform of the state-owned enterprise governance structure are analyzed empirically.It selects 2011-2015 a-share listed state-owned manufacturing enterprises as the research sample,and establishes multivariate regression model,and using SPASS21 and Eviews6.0 to do software descriptive statistics analysis,correlation analysis and multivariate linear regression analysis.The conclusion is as follows: the board scale has negative correlation with company profit ability and debt risk;The proportion of independent directors is negatively correlated with the company's profitability,debt risk and asset quality.The proportion of state-owned shares is positively correlated with operating growth capacity,profitability and asset quality.The top three executive compensation is positively correlated with the company's profitability and debt risk.The average age of senior executives is correlated with profitability,debt risk,and positive correlation with asset quality.Finally,some countermeasures are put forward based on Oriental management theory to optimize the governance structure of central enterprises.At the level of equity structure,it should be appropriate and innovative.At the board level,we should stick to the realistic and work hard.In the selection of personnel,it should be followed by virtue and ability.At the level of motivation,it is a good idea to make the best of it.It can be seen that the quality of the personnel in the central enterprises has great effect on the steady and steady development of enterprises.