Bank Linkages?market-oriented Process And Executive Compensation

Executive compensation has been widely concerned by scholars,and its contract mechanism is a hot topic in the theoretical and academic circles.In view of the fact that China is in an important period of economic transformation,and in the context of deepening the structural reform of the supply side and "releasing control clothing",the market has increased its vitality.However,the current economic development situation is still grim,the production and operation of enterprises are still facing financing difficulties and other issues.Enterprises establish such "bank linkages" by employing people who are or have been working in banks as executives.Bank affiliation can be regarded as a kind of resource owned by enterprises,which can provide reasonable suggestions for enterprise financing,reduce financing costs and effectively alleviate financing constraints.Therefore,considering the market competition mechanism,enterprises will adopt different incentive strategies for executives with bank affiliation,that is,executives with bank affiliation usually get higher pay.On this basis,in view of this relationship,this paper explores the mechanism of bank linkages on executive compensation.Further analysis is made on whether the relationship between bank affiliation and executive compensation varies with the degree of marketization.This paper chooses the sample of A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2017 as the research object.Based on principal-agent theory,effective compensation contract theory,anchoring effect theory and reputation theory,this paper puts forward the research hypothesis through theoretical analysis and reflection.Based on descriptive statistics,regression analysis and robustness test,this paper studies the relationship among bank association,marketization process and executive compensation.In this paper,the logarithm of the top three directors,supervisors and senior managers' salaries is taken as the explanatory variable,Bank Association as the independent variable,and the marketization process as the moderating variable.In order to better verify the research hypothesis,this paper chooses the logarithm of the total salary of the top three executives with the highest salary to test the robustness.Through empirical analysis and verification of the hypothesis in this paper,and the robustness test of the hypothesis,the conclusion is still valid.Based on this,this paper draws the following conclusions:(1)Compared with the enterprises without bank affiliation,the executive compensation level of the enterprises with bank affiliation is higher.(2)Compared with the regions with high degree of marketization,the regional bank affiliation with low degree of marketization can significantly improve the level of executive compensation.There are many studies on the influencing factors of executive compensation in the past literature,but there are few studies on the combination of bank affiliation and executive compensation.This paper takes bank affiliation as a starting point to study the relationship between bank affiliation and executive compensation,and further considers the impact of marketization on the relationship between bank affiliation and executive compensation,which has certain innovative significance.Bank affiliation can influence the financing constraints of enterprises,and explore the transmission mechanism of the impact on executive compensation.It not only enriches the relevant research content of executive compensation,but also improves the effectiveness of executive compensation contract.It has important practical significance for enterprises to establish effective compensation policy.