The Present Situation,problems And Optimization Strategies Of Internal Control Information Disclosure Supervision Of Listed Companies

In April 2010,China issued the supporting guidelines for internal control of enterprises,stipulating that listed companies must disclose self-evaluation reports on the effectiveness of internal control.Since then,China has entered the stage of mandatory disclosure of internal control information.The "fraudulent issuance" case of xintai electric occurred in 2016.Since 2013,it has disclosed false internal control self-evaluation report for three consecutive years,which has caused a very bad impact on the capital market.At the same time,it has attracted the attention of the regulatory authorities,the theoretical circle and the public on internal control information disclosure supervision.Standardizing the disclosure of internal control information and strict supervision is not only the obligation for the company to comply with,but also the responsibility of the supervision department.It not only has a significant impact on stakeholders,but also conducive to the healthy and sustainable development of the securities market.Therefore,the study of internal control information disclosure is not only of high theoretical value,but also of profound practical significa nce.By means of literature research,mathematical statistics and case analysis,this paper attempts to analyze and optimize the current situation of internal control information disclosure supervision.Firstly,it analyzes the status quo of internal control information disclosure supervision of listed companies in China.Starting from the case of "xintai electric",it analyzes the existing problems in the current disclosure,and then discusses the current supervision status from the aspects of information disclosure,supervision and punishment.Secondly,the existing problems are analyzed based on the cases and the current situation of supervision,including the subject level of supervision,policy level,intermediary agency level,obj ect level of supervision and punishment level.Thirdly,combined with game theory,the game model between the listed companies and the regulatory authorities,intermediary agencies and investors is constructed to analyze the equilibrium state of their existence,so as to provide ideas for the regulatory party's strategy selection and point out the direction for optimizing the regulatory strategy.Finally,based on the analysis of the current situation and problems of supervision,combined with the thinking guidance provided by the game model,the optimization strategy is proposed from the five dimensions of improving the construction of supervision subjects,improving policy construction,improving audit supervision,strengthening corporate governance and enhancing punishment.The optimization strategy proposed in this paper is of great significance for improving the internal control information disclosure supervision of listed enterprises,providing empirical evidence for the strategic choice of regulatory authorities,and contributing to the enrichment of regulatory theories.