Executive Compensation Of State-owned Enterprise,Investment Efficiency And Corporate Performance

As an important pillar of the national economy,the investment and operation efficiency of state-owned enterprises is closely related to the development of the national macro-economy and directly related to the economic interests of all citizens.At present,the phenomenon of inefficient investment exists in China's state-owned listed enterprises,and the agency problem is the root of the problem of inefficient investment.The agency problem has become the most important corporate governance problem of state-owned enterprises at present.How to reduce the agency cost has become an important breakthrough in the reform of China's state-owned enterprises.Executive compensation incentive has always been regarded as an important mechanism to solve the agency problem in the modern enterprise system.Meanwhile,the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance has always been the focus of theoretical and practical circles at home and abroad.Based on the principal viewpoints of principal-agent theory,comprehensive incentive theory and tournament theory,this paper measures executive compensation and investment efficiency in combination with relevant literature,and adopts the empirical research method to study the relationship among executive compensation,investment efficiency and corporate performance of state-owned enterprises.This paper selects China's state-owned listed enterprises from 2012 to 2017 as research samples,studies the influence of executive compensation on corporate performance of state-owned enterprises from three dimensions of salary level,salary structure and salary gap,and attempts to reveal the mechanism of executive compensation incentive by establishing the transmission mechanism of executive compensation--investment efficiency--enterprise performance.In addition,based on the institutional background of the classified governance reform of state-owned enterprises and the theory of "duality" of state-owned enterprises,this paper studies and analyzes the incentive effect of executive compensation system in state-owned enterprises with different functional positioning.It is found that both the executive compensation level and the salary gap of state-owned enterprises can significantly promote the improvement of enterprise performance,and the executive compensation structure with equity incentive has more incentive effect.In addition,executive compensation of state-owned enterprises can improve enterprise performance by restraining inefficient investment behaviors,that is,investment efficiency is an intermediary variable between executive compensation and corporate performance.Further research shows that the incentive effect of executive compensation differs significantly among state-owned enterprises with different functional positioning: in competitive state-owned enterprises,executive compensation incentive can significantly promote the improvement of corporate performance;in specific functional state-owned enterprises,executive compensation incentive has certain incentive effect;while in public welfare state-owned enterprises,executive compensation does not show significant incentive effect.The research conclusion of this paper can not only provide important micro evidence for improving the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises and improving the internal governance mechanism of state-owned enterprises,but also provide theoretical reference for establishing an effective executive compensation system of state-owned enterprises and promoting the reform process of classified governance of state-owned enterprises.In addition,the research results of this paper have certain reference value for relevant government departments to deepen the income distribution system.