On High Stock Dividends Policy Of Listed Companies From The Perspective Of Interest Transfer

With the development of capital market in China,listed companies with high stock dividends policy began to become a universal phenomenon.Since high stock dividends policy often conveys good news of listed company performance,once implemented,it will often push up the company’s stock price and attract investors’ pursuit.The high stock dividends policy has gradually arisen and led large shareholders of listed companies to take advantage of highselling stock prices to reduce their stock holdings and obtain large-value cash or even clearance to withdraw from listed companies.This paper studies the behavior of the major shareholder of a listed company in the reduction of the company’s shares with the implementation of high stock dividends policy.It analyzes whether the listed company’s high stock dividends policy is based on the company’s profitability and better returns investors’ incentives or helps the major shareholders to reduce holdings.If the major shareholder borrows a high transfer policy to reduce the holdings for the purpose of profit transfer,then what internal and external conditions provide opportunities and conditions.This paper first explains the general phenomenon of high stock dividends in China’s capital market,pointing out that many major shareholders of listed companies have reduced their holdings when the company’s implementation of high-transfer share price has risen to a high level.Many of them have used high-transfer policies to raise stock prices.The reduction of the transfer of interests,harming the interests of small and medium investors.In view of the behavior of major shareholders in the reduction of holdings with the high transfer policy of listed companies,this paper selected Yongda as a case study company,and introduced the basic information of Yongda the high stock dividends policy and the major shareholder reduction behavior.Then based on the theoretical basis of signal transmission theory,dividend catering theory and hollowing theory,the paper analyzes the motivation of listed companies to issue high stock dividends policy,and analyzes the rationality of high deliveryin combination with the actual operating conditions and profitability of Yongda It was found that the company’s operating conditions were not satisfactory when policy was implemented,and its profitability also showed a downward trend year by year,which did not conform to the theory of signal transmission.The dividend catering theory cannot explain the motives for its high transfer without hollowing theory.Instead,it uses the irrational chase of external investors to cater to the demand of large shareholders’ interests and conducts improper hightransfer behavior.Then,from the internal and external environment,it is analyzed why Yongda can successfully implement the improper high transfer policy,and found that the company’s internal shareholding structure,external market supervision and irrational investment of small investors have provided opportunities for the improper implementation of improper transfer.Based on the above case study,this paper draws the following conclusions: The high-sending transfer is irrationality with profitability declining year by year.There is a suspicion that the major shareholder will reduce the cash-out support.The hollowing theory can better explain its Implement the motivation for high delivery.The liquidation and reduction of the controlling shareholder and its unanimous actor has obvious suspicion of profit transfer,which harms the interests of small and medium shareholders.The company’s internal equity is monopolized,and external supervision and the irrational pursuit of small and mediumsized investments provides an opportunity for the unreasonable implementation of high stock dividends policy.At the end of the paper,the corresponding suggestions from the internal governance mechanism,external regulatory environment and investors of the listed company are given in order to strengthen the internal self-restraint of the listed company,and the external supervision layer can reasonably formulate the relevant high stock implementation standard rules and strengthen the Large shareholders of listed companies.