Research On The Impact Of Value Adjustment Mechanism On Backdoor Listing Companies Earnings Management

Since the CSRC's “Measures for the Management of Major Asset Restructuring of Backdoor listing companies' stipulated that both parties should sign a valuation adjustment mechanism,the valuation adjustment mechanism is increasingly applied to the major asset restructuring of backdoor listing companies.Thanks to sign valuation adjustment mechanism in the backdoor listing,in order to meet the performance commitment criteria or reduce the implementation of compensation obligations as much as possible,in recent years,some backdoor listing companies had “fake” results,such as Jiamusi electric machine factory's falsification of results after using the Shell relay.Abbott performance fraud and so on.Therefore,the impact of valuation adjustment mechanism on earnings management of backdoor listing companies is one aspect that can't be neglected in the study of private equity.A combination of theoretical research and empirical research was ado pted.On the basis of information asymmetry theory,signal transmission theory,real options theory,and corporate control theory,from the perspective of the characteristics of performance compensation agreements,the equity structure of backdoor listing companies and the structure of backdoor listing transactions,analyze the impact mechanism of performance compensation agreements on earnings management of backdoor listing companies,put forward assumptions and defined variables,build an econometrics model,and use the company data validation research hypothesis of conducting backdoor listing transactions and signing performance compensation agreements from the end of 2008 to 2014,and reach conclusions from the performance compensation agreement system.Policy recommendations are made from the perspective of backdoor listing companies.The study finds that the promised performance growth rate is significantly positively correlated with the level of earnings management of backdoor listing companies;the effect of stock compensation methods on the earnings management of backdoor listing companies is significantly stronger than that of cash compensation methods;the equity concentration of backdoor listing companies is responsible for the direction of performance compensation and backdoor listing.The relationship between earnings management of the company is negatively adjusted;the growth rate of performance under non-associated backdoors is stronger than the earnings management of backdoor listing companie s;the growth rate of backdoor listing companies that are not restructured by the same industry promises a growth rate in comparison with backdoor listing companies.The relationship between earnings management is stronger.In order to avoid the occurrence of backdoor listed company's earnings management behavior,the supervisory authority should improve the value assessment mechanism of the underlying assets when formulating the performance compensation agreement system,establish diversified performance assessment standards and provide multiple performance compensation methods.The backdoor company should accurately assess the injection.The value of the listed company's assets should be chosen as possible to backdoor companies in the same industry,and after listing on the backdoor,the equity concentration of listed companies should be appropriately increased.