The Intensity Of Tax Enforcement And Corporate Financing Constraints

Since the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,the economy has shifted from a high-speed growth stage to a high-quality development stage in China.In order to adapt to the economic and social development,the tax system reform of China also keeps deepening.At the same time,the corporate governance,as an important role of taxation has gradually received widespread attention from the academic community.According to the existing research,institutions of tax enforcement can conduct inspections through corporate financial accounts,and then directly and effectively supervise their related transactions and transfer pricing,which shows that tax enforcement has significant corporate governance effects.Based on the differences between different regions in China,this paper studies whether the intensity of tax enforcement will affect the business behavior and financing environment of enterprises,conducting further study the possible differences between these factors in state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises.Based on the above ideas,this paper collects the A-share companies listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2012 to 2017 as a research sample,and empirically analyzes the impact of tax enforcement intensity on corporate financing constraints.The main contents of this paper are as follows:The first part comes the introduction.Firstly,the research background and significance of this paper are introduced.Then the research contents and research methods of this paper are briefly introduced.Finally,the main innovations and inspirations of this paper are put forward.The second part is the review of literature.This part mainly reviews the economic consequences of tax enforcement and the factors affecting financing constraints,and reviews several types of literature on tax enforcement measurement methods.Through literature review,this paper summarizes the existing research results,finds new research directions,and obtains theoretical support for empirical research.The third part is theoretical analysis and hypothesis.Firstly,the theoretical relationship between tax enforcement intensity and corporate financing constraints is established.The relationship between the two is theoretically analyzed from two aspects,and corresponding research hypotheses are proposed.In addition,based on the heterogeneity of the problem of financing constraints between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises,further research hypotheses are proposed for the above-mentioned problems in the case of enterprises with different property rights.The fourth part studies the design.Firstly,the sample selection and data sources studied in this paper are explained.Secondly,the variables in the model are clearly defined and explained,and finally the empirical regression model is constructed.The fifth part is an empirical analysis.By descriptive statistical analysis of variables,the basic characteristics of sample companies and sample areas are clarified.Then use the correlation coefficient test and multiple regression method to study the relationship between tax enforcement intensity and corporate financing constraints.The conclusion of the sixth part.First,the conclusions and policy recommendations of this paper are proposed.Secondly,the innovation of this paper is proposed.Finally,the limitations of this study are pointed out.The conclusion of this paper points out that the increase of tax enforcement intensity will make enterprises face stronger financing constraints.Moreover,compared with state-owned enterprises,the negative impact of tax enforcement on corporate financing is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises.Based on the above conclusions,this paper proposes the following recommendations:First of all,we should dialectically understand the tax enforcement and corporate financing constraints,strictly improve the taxation efforts under the norms of tax laws and strengthen the intensity of tax audits,thus promoting the standardized development of enterprises..Secondly,for the financing constraints faced by non-state-owned enterprises,the monopoly of the loan market should be gradually resolved,and non-state-owned financial institutions should be allowed to enter the market to participate in competition.At the same time,measures should be taken to completely transform existing financial institutions to facilitate their conversion of operating mechanisms.Fundamentally ease the financing difficulties of non-state-owned enterprises.The research in this paper provides important practical significance,The improvement of the tax enforcement system by government departments can effectively adjust the financing pressure faced by non-state-owned enterprises.The empirical results of this paper show that although compared with state-owned enterprises,the financing capacity of non-state-owned enterprises is significantly higher.However,when the intensity of tax enforcement is increased,state-owned enterprises are more affected by increased financing constraints.Therefore,the government must not only extend the "supporting hand" to non-state-owned enterprises,but also pay more attention to the operational efficiency and competitiveness of state-owned enterprises.In the process of economic development in the future,government departments can urge enterprises to continuously enhance information disclosure and improve the credibility of information through appropriate external supervision mechanisms such as tax enforcement.Through their own initiative,they can improve their debt financing capabilities and improve the external conditions for management of the enterprises..The innovations studied in this paper are as follows.Most of the research on related issues in the past has focused on the impact of external policies on corporate financing constraints,or on the unilateral impact of tax enforcement on corporate behavior.In this paper,the empirical model is built on the investment-cash flow sensitivity model,and the multi-faceted influence of tax collection and management intensity on corporate financing constraints is studied.When further researching the nature of property rights,the nature of property rights,internal cash flow and taxation of enterprises are introduced.The interaction items of the three collection strengths are reflected,there draw more meticulous conclusions than previous research results.This paper optimizes the measurement of tax enforcement.The empirical model is built on the investment-cash flow sensitivity model.When studying the impact of tax collection and management intensity on corporate financing constraints,the interaction term of internal cash flow and tax collection intensity is adopted.When further research on the nature of property rights is introduced.The interaction of the three.The positive and negative coefficients of the final regression result can visually reflect the corresponding correlation.Based on China's unique national conditions and policy environment,this paper analyzes the existing literature and clarifies the fact that the tax enforcement has both positive and negative impacts on corporate financing constraints,and then empirically tests the two dominant influences.The party,and thus proposed corresponding recommendations for the reform of the tax collection and management system and the mitigation of corporate financing constraints,while supplementing and expanding the relevant research on the intensity of tax collection and management.