A Research On The Effect Of Equity Incentive From The Prospect Of Contractual Terms

As an important part of the modern corporate governance system,equity incentives can effectively solve the principal-agent problem arising from the separation of the two powers,and are considered to be the "golden handcuffs" to retain the company's core talent and the "engine" to promote the company's performance growth.With the completion of the split share structure reform and the promulgation of a series of related regulations,equity incentives,as an important measure to improve the corporate legal person governance structure,have been rapidly implemented in China's listed companies.Especially in the context of vigorously promoting the reform of mixed ownership at this stage,the implementation of equity incentives has ushered in a new opportunity,and its governance status has been further highlighted.In this context,it is of great significance to systematically evaluate the implementation effect of the equity incentive system.This article combines the basic views of agency theory and contract theory,and shifts the focus of research to the micro level,decomposes and refines the equity incentive contract,with key contract terms such as the incentive model,incentive strength,incentive object,incentive conditions and incentive period.Set as the research object,discuss the impact mechanism and effect of the setting and arrangement of key contract clauses on the equity incentive effect,with a view to opening the "black box" of the relationship between equity incentives and corporate performance from the micro contract clause setting level,for equity incentives Provide further reference for further research and improvement of the implementation effect of equity incentives of listed companies.In terms of research methods,before the multiple regression analysis,this article uses the counterfactual causal inference framework as the basis,and uses the propensity score matching method to screen and control the research samples,which alleviates the sample selection bias to a certain extent,and passes the regression test The reliability of the hypothesis in this paper is obtained,and the views of this paper are drawn:(1)The adaptive nature clause is a key element that affects equity incentives.Restricted stocks have better short-term incentive effects.In the long run,stock options have a more significant effect;(2)The stronger the incentive of the incentive clause,the more significant the dynamic relationship between equity incentives and corporate performance.The greater the incentive intensity and the greater the number of incentive objects,the greater the degree of equity incentives to improve corporate performance,and the incentive effect The stronger the continuity is,the weaker incentive contract arrangements have no obvious dynamic effects;(3)The setting of binding clauses can strengthen the dynamic relationship between equity incentives and corporate performance.The stricter the incentive conditions,the more the incentive period In the long run,the stronger the performance improvement of equity incentives,the longer the duration.