Managerial Discretion,Institutional Investor Shareholding And Enterprise Innovation Efficiency

As one of the leading ways to seek resource allocation and interest coordination,power research on the issue of managerial discretion has always been the focus of economists and management scientists.With the expansion of corporate management decision-making power,the influence of executives on corporate decision-making has become increasingly important.With the rapid development of the economy,competition is becoming fiercer,and innovation has become an important strategy for enterprises.Among them,innovation activities provide a continuous source of power for the sustainable development of enterprises.In recent years,China's investment in innovation has been expanding with the growth of the economy.According to the data,on the one hand,the R&D investment of Chinese enterprises is increasing,but on the other hand,the economic efficiency indicators brought by the innovation output of Chinese enterprises have not improved significantly.Therefore,it is especially important for enterprises to make strategic decisions on innovative investment projects before carrying out innovation activities.Innovative investment decisions not only affect the flow of enterprise resources,but also whether enterprises can use resources to achieve sustainable development,and avoid waste and invalid occupation of enterprise resources as much as possible.To achieve efficient corporate innovation activities.Therefore,this paper deeply explores the role of managerial discretion on the efficiency of enterprise innovation,emphasizes that effective innovation investment behavior is truly valuable innovation behavior,and explores the level of managerial discretion,which can maintain the innovation efficiency of enterprises at a higher level.With the expansion of the power of corporate executives,whether managers can reasonably allocate corporate resources and whether corporate resources can play the most prominent role through the manager's operating activities,thereby improving the efficiency of corporate innovation activities,has been the focus of research in academic circles.Issues,and governance issues related to managerial decision-making power are also hot topics in academic circles.Among them,institutional investors,as "invisible supervisors" of listed companies,have certain management experience and have solid professional knowledge.Therefore,they have played a role in external governance to a certain extent,reducing the "noise"between shareholders and managers."Loose information barriers and reduce agency costs." Institutional investors,as "invisible supervisors" of listed companies,have mature management experience and rich professional knowledge,reduce the asymmetry of information between management and shareholders,and reduce agency costs,to a certain extent.The role of external governance.However,different institutional investors have a heterogeneous governance role.Therefore,how to optimize the equity structure of listed companies and give full play to the role of institutional investors in supervision and governance is crucial,and analyze the different supervisory roles of heterogeneous institutional investors,what is of great significance to enrich the content of corporate governance.This paper takes China's 2011-2018 Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed company as the research object,and uses the principal-agent theory to discuss the problem of enterprise innovation efficiency of listed companies in China under the condition of managerial discretion,and further considers it as one of the corporate governance factors.Whether the relevant role of institutional investors'shareholding characteristics will play a corresponding role in supervision and restraint by restricting corporate managerial discretion and affecting their innovation decisions,thereby improving the effectiveness of corporate governance and improving its innovation efficiency.The empirical research finds that(1)the managerial discretion and the enterprise creation efficiency show an inverted U-shaped relationship,that is,with the continuous expansion of the managerial discretion,the enterprise innovation efficiency will not grow with it,but will gradually decline;(2)institutional investors Holding shares can inhibit the negative relationship between the power of managerial discretion and the "inverted U"relationship of innovation efficiency,and the greater the shareholding ratio,the more obvious the adjustment effect;(3)Pressure resistance type institutional investor's shareholding significantly regulates the inverted U-shaped relationship between management decision-making power and corporate innovation efficiency,that is,higher pressure resistance type institutional investor holdings strengthens the positive effect of low management decision-making power on corporate innovation efficiency.Reducing the negative impact of high management decisions on corporate innovation efficiency.(4)The shareholding of pressure-sensitive institutional investors could not regulate the inverted U-shaped relationship between management decision-making power and corporate innovation efficiency significantly.Based on the results of empirical research,this paper puts forward the following suggestions:(1)Reasonable control of position rights and remuneration rights that affect the level of managerial discretion;(2)Reasonable control of managerial discretion,emphasis on personal characteristics of managers;(3)Optimization of shareholding structure of listed companies Fully mobilize the supervision and governance role of institutional investors;(4)improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies.