Corporate Tax Avoidance,Equity Concentration And Dual Agency Cost

The economic consequences of corporate tax planning have been the focus of scholars at home and abroad for many years,and corporate tax avoidance will undoubtedly lead to the issue of principal-agent.Some scholars have carried out preliminary analysis on the first type of agency problems caused by corporate tax avoidance,but there are few documents that incorporate dual agency costs into the tax avoidance agency research system.Since the entrust-agent problems faced by enterprises with different equity concentration are different,the concentration of ownership will also have an impact on the correlation between corporate tax avoidance and dual agency costs.On this basis,whether there is a difference in the impact of tax avoidance on the dual agency costs of enterprises with different property rights is also a problem that should be further studied.This paper uses empirical research methods to select data from A-share listed companies in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2011 to 2017.The degree of tax avoidance and the impact on the two types of agency costs and the adjustment effect of equity concentration between the two were examined.The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between tax avoidance and double agency cost;the higher the concentration of equity,the weaker the positive correlation between tax avoidance and the first type of agency cost,and the positive correlation with the second type of agency cost.Strong;through further research,it is found that compared with non-state-owned enterprises,the positive correlation between tax avoidance and the first type of agency costs in state-owned enterprises is stronger,and the effect of tax avoidance on the second type of agency costs of the two types of enterprises is not significantly different.Finally,combined with theoretical analysis and empirical results,several suggestions for improvement are proposed for listed companies and external regulatory authorities in China:enterprises should carry out tax planning within a reasonable range,minimize the increase in agency costs brought about by tax avoidance,and reduce the negative impact of corporate value.To strengthen the corporate tax liability and social responsibility awareness;the tax regulatory department should strengthen the timely and full disclosure of tax-related information,especially the monitoring of complex transactions and abnormal related transactions.Strengthen the supervision of major shareholders of listed companies with concentrated equity,comprehensively grasp enterprise information,and reduce the level of corporate tax avoidance;the state should further optimize the shareholding structure,reduce the adverse effects caused by unreasonable shareholding structure,strengthen the protection mechanism of small and medium shareholders,and establish sound rules.The system reduces the problem of corporate agency and strengthens the effective governance of enterprises.