Research On The Relationship Between The Term Mismatch Of Investment And Financing Of Enterprises And The Equity Pledge Of Controlling Shareholders

In the report of the 19 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,it is clearly pointed out that it is imperative to fight against major risks,keep the bottom line that systemic financial risks do not occur,and deal with risks in the financial field safely by promoting structural deleveraging.Facing the double tests of economic downturn and structural deleveraging,especially the increasingly serious problem of investment and financing term mismatch,it is very important to guarantee the financial support for the development of real economy,solve the legitimate financing needs of the enterprise sector,and gradually resolve and deal with the risks in the financial field.It is of great practical significance to explore the external financing problems of investment and financing enterprises' mismatch companies.Equity pledge is favored by large shareholders because of its convenient handling procedures and the momentum of economic stock.It has made some contributions to ease the financing constraints of enterprises and activate equity trading.However,since 2015,there have been many cases of closing out of Pledged Shares in the capital market,causing panic among the majority of small and medium-sized investors,which has become the most worthy of in-depth study in recent years One of the economic phenomena.The existing literature does not pay attention to the possible economic consequences of corporate investment and financing term mismatches at the shareholder level.The research takes A-share non-financial enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets as the research object,through the construction of empirical model and the use of logit and OLS methods for regression,and finds that:Corporate Investment and financing term mismatches have significant restrictive effects on the pledge behavior of controlling shareholders,not only weakening the The intention of pledge also limits the scale of pledge.Further through the interactive regression,it is found that the nature of property right has a regulatory effect on the above relationship.The nature of property right of state-owned enterprises significantly weakens the restrictive effect of investment and financing term mismatch of controlling shareholders' equity pledge.Further through the heterogeneity analysis,it is found that in the areas of higher cash holding,betterquality of internal control and higher level of economic development,the limited effect of investment and financing term mismatch on the equity pledge of controlling shareholders is small,which mainly limits the scale of equity pledge,but does not limit the willingness of controlling shareholders to carry out equity pledge.The research enriches the relevant literature on the economic consequences of the mismatching of the investment and financing period of the enterprise and the influencing factors of the equity pledge of the controlling shareholders,which provides useful evidence for the controlling shareholders to make decisions on the basis of the company's risk status.The risk control of financial institutions,such as banks,not only shows the restrictions on the debts of listed companies,but also may further restrict the external financing of the controlling shareholders.The results also show that in the process of structural deleveraging,it is necessary to take into account the legitimate financing needs of the companies whose investment and financing terms are mismatched,to avoid the risk-taking of listed companies and their controlling shareholders,and to once again large-scale pledge positions.