| Before 2019,85.56%of A-share listed companies have participated in the stock pledge business,with the maximum proportion of a single listed company's market value of was 78.96%,and equity pledge proportion of more than one half of these companies was between 0 and 30%;57.93%of listed companies had equity pledged by controlling shareholders,of which the maximum equity pledged proportion by controlling shareholders was 100%,and the companies whose pledged proportion was more than 90%accounted for 11.08%(The data come from Wind).Stock pledge has been traded frequently in Chinese market.Many listed companies represented by LETV have seen stock pledge explosion in succession which has brought huge risks to the capital market.lt also has aroused thinking if the equity pledge will cause bad influences on listed companies?As the internal control process involves the enterprises' compliance,operation,reporting,strategy and asset safety objectives,the effectiveness of companies' internal control can thoroughly reflect the operating efficiency and financial situation.Therefore,this paper's research target are controlling shareholders'conducts for equity pledge and the effectiveness of a company's internal control.After combing related literature and understanding relevant concepts,the hypotheses of this thesis is on the basis of relevant researches.By selecting companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets which are from 2009 to 2018 as research targets,this thesis explores the relative reaction between the stock pledge of controlling shareholders and the effectiveness of companies' internal control through multiple regression as well as the influence under different pledge investment direction and the enterprise property right,then passes the propensity score matching(PSM)'s robustness test.What found is that equity pledge by controlling shareholders causes negative impacts on the effectiveness of companies' internal control,and with the pledge proportion and scale increasing,this negative impact will be expanded;compared with the pledge funds investing to the pledged listed company,when the funds investing to shareholders themselves as well as the third party,its bad influence is more intense.The background of state-owned enterprises weakens the inhibition effect,while non-state-owned enterprises' shareholders are likely have more negative impact on the enterprises' internal controls.This paper's innovations are mainly lies on:(1)on the research perspective,the existing research focuses on stock pledge's economic consequences,but mostly focus on companies' performance and value,earnings capacity and publish of information;the influencing factors of internal control's researches mainly focuses on corporate board of directors,management,audit committee,equity's structure and company development.There is little research relating the relationship between stock pledge and enterprises' internal control equality.Thinking of behaviors of the controlling shareholder,based on the controlling stockholders' special status and the relevant characteristics of equity pledge,this paper explores the influence mechanism or path of stock pledge on internal control,and selects three dimensions of equity pledge which are this behavior itself,pledge proportion and pledge scale to test the correlation between them.Second,on the research content.In this paper,the samples are grouped according to the investment directions of pledge funds and enterprise property rights,and further test the significant differences from the relationship between stock pledge and enterprises' internal control. |
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