Research On Busy Executives Of Chinese Hedge Fund And Fund Performance

Hedge fund has grown into an important institutional investor as mutual fund in overseas financial markets.In contrast,China hedge fund started relatively late,but with the improvement of the capital market and the scale of hedge fund has gradually increased,it has become a close rival to mutual fund with outstanding investment performance.There are a large number of scholars have conducted extensive research on hedge fund's performance characteristics and performance influencing factors form aspects of market environment,product characteristics,fund managers characteristics,etc.However,the discussion on the governance structure of hedge fund companies is slightly inadequate.As one kind of financial company,corporate governance structure will also have an impact on the business decisions and fund product's performance.This paper explores the impact of busy executive of hedge fund firm to the products' performance from the angle of corporate governance.This paper finds that the higher the busy management proportion in hedge fund firms,the worse the fund performance.In the companies with high equity concentration or high equity balance,there is the same negative connection.If the companies connected by fund firm management belong to the real industry,the proportion of busy executives has no significant impact on the performance of the fund.In addition,the busy executives also have impact on the stock selection and timing ability of fund products.Based on the detailed data of hedge fund corporate governance structure in China,this paper empirically tests the hypotheses that oversea literature can only give the theoretical predictions.This paper not only has incremental contribution to the literature about the influence factors of hedge fund,but also supplements the research literature in the field of hedge fund corporate governance.In the meanwhile,the test has practical value that it can answer the actual impact of management connection of hedge fund companies in China,and provide empirical evidence for financial regulators to further refined supervision to prevent systemic financial risks.