Research On "Tunneling" Behavior Of Large Shareholders Of Listed Companies In China

In recent years,with the rapid development of C hina's capital market,the economic strength has improved significantly,and the market environment is also in constant change,but there are still new problems emerging.As the core of C hina's capital market,the "hollowing out" behavior of major shareholders of listed companies results in the loss of capital in the capital market,which hinders the healthy development of the capital market to a certain extent.Since the reform of non-tradable shares,although China's regulatory authorities have issued a number of rules and regulations,and there have been some improvements in legal supervision,the "hollowing out" of listed companies by major shareholders is still relatively common,disrupting the normal operation of C hina's securities market.With the more and more complicated means of "tunneling" by major shareholders of listed companies in our country,it is also difficult for securities market supervision departments to find out at the initial stage of "tunneling" by major shareholders of listed companies so as to protect the legitimate rights and interests of listed companies and small and medium shareholders from encroachment in a timely manner.It is usually in the case of poor management or plummeting stock prices of listed companies that the regulatory authorities are aware of,and the "hollowing out" behavior of major shareholders is exposed.Based on the above situation,it is particularly important to study and discuss the "tunneling" behavior of major shareholders of listed companies in China.In order to make an in-depth analysis of the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders,firstly,this paper introduces the research background,purpose and significance of the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders of listed companies in China,expounds the research ideas,innovation points and difficulties of this paper,and sorts out the domestic and foreign relevant literatures on the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders of listed companies,including the research on the motivation,methods,consequences,prevention measures and game research in the securities market.Secondly,it analyzes the status quo of "tunneling" of major s hareholders of listed companies in C hina,mainly from the way of "tunneling" of major shareholders and its economic consequences.Then,it analyzes the internal and external influence mechanisms of the tunneling behavior of major shareholders of listed companies in China,innovatively constructs an evolutionary game model among small and medium shareholders,major shareholders and external regulatory authorities,discusses the evolutionary stability strategies under different strategies adopted by all parties in the game,and conducts numerical simulation experiments on the evolutionary game model using Matlab2019 b software,and draws a series of conclusions.Finally,according to the game theory and simulation results,some pertinent suggestions are put forward.This paper introduces the game research perspective,and makes a comprehensive and systematic analysis on different strategies of "tunneling" behavior of major shareholders of listed companies.It not only enriches the relevant literature on the "tunneling" of listed companies by major shareholders,but also has certain theoretical significance to analyze the "tunneling" of major shareholders with evolutionary game model.Moreover,this paper puts forward targeted suggestions to prevent the occurrence of "tunneling" of major shareholders,which has certain practical significance to prevent the occurrence of "tunneling" of major shareholders and protect the interests of small and medium shareholders from encroachment.