Research On Te Impact Of Private Placement On A-share Listed Companies' Operating Performance

Private placement,referring to issue shares to a small number of specific objects to raise funds,is currently the fastest-growing and largest financing method in China.The purpose of supporting private placements for China is to broaden the financing channels of listed companies and promote the company's long-term sustainable development.However,some scholars have found that the company's long-term operating performance has continued to decline after the implementation of private placements,which is called "performance mystery of the private placement".The development of private placements in China is relatively short,and related research by domestic scholars is still immature,but its size has occupied more than 90%of the domestic equity refinancing market,making it the most popular refinancing method.Therefore,in-depth discussion and analysis of the relationship between the private placement and the company's operating performance has important theoretical and practical significance.This article focuses on the impact of private placements on the long-term operating performance of listed companies.Based on theoretical analysis,this article selects Shanghai and Shenzhen Main Board A-share listed companies that implemented private placements from 2013 to 2015 for empirical testing.First,constructing a regression model to examine the changes in operating performance in the three years before and after the private placements,and to test whether there is a "performance mystery" of private placements in China;Secondly,introducing double differential variables to analyze the special changes in the operating performance of companies with managerial agency problems after the issuance,and to test whether the agency problem is the cause of the "performance mystery" of the private placements;Finally,the grouping regression analysis is used to analyze the difference in the results of participation between major shareholders and non-major shareholders,and to test the "governance effect" of major shareholders.After theoretical and empirical analysis,the findings are as follow:Firstly,there is a "performance mystery" of private placements in China.After the issuance,the companies'operating performance will continue to decline for a long time.Secondly,the manager agency problem is the reason for the "performance mystery" of private placements.After the private placement,the operating results of companies with the agency issue declined even more.Thirdly,the participation of the major shareholders has not exerted an effective "governance effect".The participation of major shareholders in the private placement does not effectively improve the problem of managerial agency,but worsens the deterioration of operating performance.Based on the above results,the end of this article puts forward corresponding countermeasures for the national regulatory authority and the listed company itself.On one hand,the national regulatory authority should strengthen the pre-approval of private placements,add third-party regulatory agencies,and improve the information disclosure system.On the other hand,listed companies need to build a governance structure with clear powers and responsibilities,formulate a reasonable plan for the use of raised funds,strengthen information disclosure,and consciously accept the supervision of the national regulatory authorities and shareholders.