Multi-case Study On The Agency Problem Of Listed Companies Without Actual Controller

With the idea of " thought separation of two rights ",the ownership is becoming more and more decentralized,and the control rights has evolved towards multi-polarization and diversification.In fact,it shows that not all listed companies have actual controllers,some of the listed companies still have no actual controllers,and the number of such companies is increasing constantly.In a listed company with no actual controller,the proportion of shareholders is scattered,and none of them can control the company,which is essentially the control of the company by the management,so the agency problem between the shareholders and the management will inevitably arise.It is effective for corporate governance to study the agency problem of listed companies without actual controllers.Firstly,the thesis expounds the background and significance of the research,consults and reviews the relevant literature on agency problem,and puts forward the research framework,research methods and innovations according to the research contents.Secondly,the thesis summarizes the related conceptions of agency problem and the theoretical basis,and makes the research design and constructs the theoretical model.Next,the case companies with agency problems are grouped and analyzed from four specific forms of agency problem: executive compensation,official consumption,executive effort degree and investment efficiency.Cross-case cluster analysis technique is used to analyze the research cases comprehensively and the comparative analysis is carried out by selecting the comparative cases,and the results are verified by the non-parametric test.Finally,it is concluded that the main forms of agency problem of listed companies without actual controllers are: abnormal executive compensation,abnormal official consumption,insufficient executive effort degree and inefficient investment.This thesis adopts the method of multi-case study,and systematically discusses the agency problem of eight listed companies without actual controllers in the four industries of production and supply of electric power and heat power industry,medicine manufacturing industry,non-mental mineral product industry and manufacturing of computer,communication and other electronic equipment industry.The research results of the thesis can provide reference for the reform of the control power structure and the governance structure of the listed companies,which is useful for the listed companies to reduce the agency cost,improve business efficiency and protect the vested interests of the shareholders.