Analyst Rating,Property Nature And Earnings Management

In the capital market,the principal-agent relationship will lead to information asymmetry,which can help the company's management to use the earnings to adjust the company's profits.In the context of the continuous expansion of China's capital market and the government's increasing emphasis on capital market construction,the role of analysts is also increasing,and it has become an important part of external governance.As a link between listed companies and investors,analysts mainly publish ratings and earnings forecasts of target companies 'stocks by tracking and investigating listed companies and writing research reports,and then influence companies by influencing market sentiment and consensus expectations.The existing literature starts with the number of analyst rating reports and discusses the improvement or suppression of earnings management coverage(attention / number of followers)to prove the impact of analysts on earnings management and has achieved rich theoretical results.However,at present,there is little literature to discuss the earnings management behavior of enterprises under different rating conditions based on the changes of ratings and analyst ratings.Therefore,it is necessary to discuss the impact of ratings and rating changes on earnings management of listed companies in the research report released by analysts.This paper takes 25 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from the first quarter of 2014 to the first quarter of 2019 as the research sample,and uses a variety of linear regression methods to conduct empirical tests and ratings on the earnings of listed companies through analyst ratings to change management influences.The results found that:(1)In a static environment,the degree of earnings management is negatively correlated with analyst ratings.The lower the analyst's rating,the more companies tend to use earnings management to reverse the market's pessimistic expectations of the market to meet the company's financing and market value management needs.(2)In a dynamic environment,when the analyst's rating changes,the company's earnings management degree is negatively related to the analyst's rating change direction,that is,when the analyst adjusts or maintains the rating upward,the company's earnings management degree is low;when When the analyst adjusts the rating downward,the level of earnings management of the company will be higher;(3)After further considering the property rights of the enterprise,it is found that,compared with the state-owned enterprise,the degree of earnings management of the non-state-owned enterprise by the analyst rating and rating changes The impact is greater.Based on the above research conclusions,this article puts forward proposals to improve the linkage between regulatory authorities and analysts,improve the construction of the analyst industry system,and actively promote the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises,with a view to giving full play to the external governance role of analysts and curbing corporate surplus Provide management support.