Research On Executive Equity Incentive And Corporate Performance Is Based On Evidence From The Perspective Of Motivation

Known as the "golden handcuffs" in the market,the equity incentive system was originally implemented to solve the principal-agent problem caused by the separation of company's control right and management right.However,in the implementation process of equity incentive system,its defects are gradually highlighted,such as accounting fraud,false statement of surplus,concealment of huge debts,self-reward of senior executives,etc.,which eventually led to the cancellation of equity incentive plan.The reasons are as follows: firstly,under the incentive system of financial indicators to measure the performance of senior executives,senior executives have the pressure and motivation of fraud;Secondly,compared with shareholders,senior executives have the information advantage and may be motivated to use the equity incentive plan to get additional remuneration.Moreover,some incentives are based on past performance and have a lag that makes it difficult to measure current and future performance.Therefore,from the perspective of motivation,it is of great significance to study the relationship between executive equity incentive and corporate performance to enhance corporate value.This paper takes a-share listed companies that have announced the implementation of equity incentive in China from 2014 to 2018 as samples to empirically analyze the impact of executive equity incentive on corporate performance.The main research works are as follows:Firstly,the event method is adopted.Using the market adjustment model to calculate the excess accumulative rate of return(CAR),and combining with the validity period of equity incentive,the equity incentive schemes of the sample companies were divided into incentive and non-incentive types.Secondly,modeling is based on different motivation perspectives of motivating and non-motivating.Through descriptive statistics,correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis,the influence of equity incentive on corporate performance under different motivations was examined and the robustness test was conducted.Finally,the paper starts with the incentive models of restricted stock and stock options selected by most sample companies,and studies the influence of different incentive models on corporate performance on the basis of distinguishing the incentive models from the non-incentive models.The conclusion shows that under the incentive motivation,the equity incentive and its incentive strength have a significant positive correlation with corporate performance.Under non-incentive motivation,there is an insignificant negative correlation between equity incentive and corporate performance,but there is a significant negative correlation between equity incentive strength and corporate performance.Compared with restricted stock incentive,stock option has a better effect on promoting corporate performance than restricted stock incentive.Compared with stock option incentive,restricted stock is more beneficial to the improvement of corporate performance under non-incentive motivation.The innovation points of this paper are as follows: first,the motivation of implementing the equity incentive plan is divided according to the dual assessment indexes of the exercise price and the effective period of the equity incentive plan.Secondly,on the basis of dividing equity incentive into incentive and non-incentive,this paper studies the influence of stock option and restricted stock incentive on corporate performance.