Research On The Relationship Between Comparability Of Accounting Information And Inefficient Investment From The Perspective Of Life Cycle

Investment is an important activity necessary for an enterprise to achieve development.From a micro level,efficient investment can improve the profitability of the enterprise,which is conducive to the increase of its value and long-term development;from a macro level,effective investment can rationally allocate social resources and promote the stability of national economy increase.However,agency conflicts and information asymmetry issues make the listed companies in China generally have inefficient investment,which seriously damages the development of enterprises and the good operation of social economy.Therefore,how to alleviate these two types of problems and suppress the inefficient investment caused by them is the key issue for scholars to study.At present,some scholars have confirmed that under the circumstances of high overall quality,robustness and transparency of accounting information,the problem of agency conflicts and information asymmetry has been alleviated,and non-efficient investment will be reduced accordingly.As one of the important characteristics of the quality of accounting information,can comparability also restrain non-efficient investment behavior? In addition,companies face different levels of agency conflicts and information asymmetry at different stages of their development,and investment behavior is also different.Does the comparability of accounting information inhibit the inefficient investment that occurs in companies at all life cycle stages effect?This article first analyzes the causes of inefficient investment through information asymmetry theory and principal-agent theory,and analyzes the characteristics and investment behavior of enterprises in different life cycle stages through life cycle theory,and second specifically analyzes the higher comparability of accounting information How to alleviate information asymmetry and agency conflicts among related stakeholders,and then play a role in inefficient investment;and whether this role varies with the progress of the enterprise life cycle.In terms of empirical research,the 2010-2018 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies are used as the research object,the De Franco(2011)model is used to measure the comparability of accounting information,the Richardson(2006)model is used to measure inefficient investments,and the Dickinson(2011)method is used.Divide the enterprise life cycle,and then establish a regression model to test the proposed hypothesis.The empirical research shows that:(1)Inefficient investment behaviors of listed companies in China are common,and the degree of overinvestment is more serious;(2)The increase in the comparability of accounting information can have a significant inhibitory effect on overinvestment and a significant mitigating effect on underinvestment;(3)Inefficient investment runs through all stages of the enterprise's life cycle,and the improvement of comparability does not have any effect on the inefficient investment behaviors that occur in enterprises at all stages of the life cycle.Specifically,for companies in the growth and maturity phases,the improvement in comparability will help to suppress their overinvestment and also alleviate their underinvestment;for companies in the recession period,the improvement in comparability can only be overinvested.Behavior acts as an inhibitory effect,and it is not significant for underinvestment.On the basis of the above research,relevant suggestions are made to improve the comparability of corporate accounting information and reduce its inefficient investment behavior.The research in this article has enriched the literature on the economic consequences of accounting information comparability and the inefficient investment governance mechanism,and introduced a dynamic perspective of the enterprise life cycle,which provides new ideas for studying the relationship between the two.