Research On Pledging Of Stock Rights By Controling Shareholders And R & D Expenditure

Among many financing methods,equity pledge has become a popular financing method for many listed companies.However,with the development of equity pledges,there are also a series of problems,such as additional margin or collateral,and stock price "bursting" leading to the transfer of control.Although the shareholder's equity pledge is an individual's behavior,the risk after the shareholder's equity pledge will affect the controlling shareholder's risk attitude and corporate decision-making,and further affect the company's innovation activities.Related research has paid attention to the relationship between equity pledge and R & D expenditure,but the research is not deep enough.Therefore,the research on the impact of the controlling shareholder's equity pledge on the company's R & D expenditure is particularly important.This article conducts an in-depth study of the controlling shareholder's equity pledge behavior from the perspective of company R & D expenditure,and explores the company's R & D under the adjustment of the equity share of the controlling shareholder's equity pledge in the equity pledge,the company's separation of powers,and the R & D expense plus deduction policy through empirical research.The impact of expenditure policy choices.This article regresses the 8-year data of Shenzhen and Shanghai A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2018 of non-state listed companies to verify the hypotheses mentioned in this article:(1)Under the conditions of other conditions unchanged,there is a pledge of controlling shareholder equity The company has a significant inhibitory effect on the company's R & D expenditure.(2)Under the condition that other conditions remain unchanged,when the controlling shareholder invests the equity pledge funds to individuals or third parties,the controlling shareholder's equity pledge behavior will increase the degree of suppression of the company's research and development expenditure.(3)Under the condition that other conditions remain unchanged,the greater the separation between the two powers of the company,the greater the degree of inhibition of the shareholder's equity pledge behavior on the company's R & D expenditure.(4)The policy of super deduction of R & D expenses will weaken the negative correlation between the equity pledge of the controlling shareholder and the company's innovation R & D expenditure.In this paper,the regression model is used to verify that the company's controlling shareholder's equity pledge can inhibit the company's R & D expenditure.In the regression model and group test,it is found that the negative relationship between the equity investment pledge and the company's R & D expenditure is strengthened by the direction of capital investment and the separation of the two powers of the company,and the deduction policy for R & D expenses can weaken the negative relationship between the equity pledge and the company's R & D expenditure.To relationship.The contribution of this article is to study the influence of controlling shareholder equity pledge on the company's R & D investment by introducing three adjustment variables of equity pledge capital investment,the separation of the company's two powers and the R & D expense plus deduction policy.The adjustment variables are novel,and these three variables It represents three different dimensions: the pledge behavior's capital investment,the separation of the two powers within the controlling shareholder company,and the external macro-policy level to observe the impact of equity pledge on R & D expenditure.