| Due to the asymmetric information in the capital market,enterprises often conduct earnings management in refinancing to maximize their financing benefits,but excessive earnings management will mislead investors' decisions,harm investors' interests,and have a negative impact on the future performance of enterprises.In recent years,securities regulatory authorities have strengthened supervision over refinancing activities such as private placement and rights offering.The introduction of new refinancing rules and new reduction rules in 2017 makes refinancing methods such as private placement and rights offering less attractive to listed companies.Convertible bonds have not been affected,and have received policy support in the aspect of review and subscription,ushered in a new round of development opportunities,coupled with its unique financing characteristics,gradually attracted the attention and favor of listed companies.Under the guidance of policies,a large number of listed companies with refinancing needs have been diverted to the convertible bond market.The proportion of convertible bond financing in the refinancing structure has been increasing,and the earnings management behavior in convertible bond financing has also attracted the attention of the market.In terms of research,there are few studies on earnings management of convertible bond financing,and most of them are empirical studies.There are also deficiencies in the specific details of corporate earnings management in convertible bond financing.Based on this,this paper proposes three questions: do listed companies have earnings management behaviors when conducting convertible bond financing? By what means does the issuer of convertible bonds manage earnings? How to deal with the earnings management behavior of enterprises in convertible bond financing?This paper adopts the method of case study to study the problem of earnings management in the financing of convertible bonds of listed companies.Firstly,it analyzes the possibility of earnings management in the financing of convertible bonds through theoretical analysis and combined with the relevant research results of refinancing earnings management.Then,the paper selects Huifeng Joint-Stock,which is financed by convertible bonds issued in recent years,as a case for further analysis,identifies its earnings management behavior,analyzes its earnings management methods and consequences,and answers the above questions.After research and analysis,this paper believes that enterprises have relatively obvious earnings management in the year of convertible bond financing,and the earnings management of Huifeng Joint-Stock is mainly reflected in the positive control of operating revenue,operating cost and non-recurring profit and loss.Through the artificial choice of accounting policies and the disposal of loss-making subsidiaries means to achieve.From the perspective of the consequences of Huifeng Joint-Stock's earnings management,although earnings management can enable enterprises to realize the financing of convertible bonds smoothly,it cannot solve the objective problems existing in enterprises,and the performance reversal caused by earnings management will greatly damage the interests of enterprises and investors.Therefore,we should strengthen the supervision of the convertible bond market and guard against the risk of surplus management of convertible bond financing.The theoretical significance of this study is to make up for the deficiencies of previous empirical studies on earnings management of convertible bonds in details of corporate earnings management through case analysis,and to enrich the research results on the convertible bond market in refinancing earnings management.At the same time,this study has positive practical significance for investors to be cautious in investment,for regulatory authorities to guard against market risks of convertible bonds,and for enterprises to operate in compliance.There are 7 figures,21 tables and 46 references in this paper. |
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