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Research On The Impact Of Analysts' Follow-up On Tax Avoidance

Posted on:2021-03-01Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J Y JinFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330614957944Subject:Taxation
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In the current capital market,securities analysts,with their mastery of professional knowledge and analytical skills,study the annual reports disclosed by listed companies,collect public and non-public information affecting asset pricing,and issue earnings forecasts and investment reports after a reasonable valuation.Analysts are connected with listed companies and investors,and their important role has attracted the attention of enterprises and even the community.At the same time,with the increasingly fierce competition at home and abroad and the increasingly intensified trend of economic globalization,listed companies will take tax avoidance actions for their own interests,which is bound to reduce the volume of national tax,resulting in unfair tax burden,so the relevant situation of enterprise tax avoidance has also attracted the attention of academic and practical circles.Based on this research background and reviewing the relevant theoretical literature,this paper demonstrates the role of the seller analysts in the external governance of the company through empirical research,and explores whether their follow-up has significant "supervision effect" on the tax incentive process of the enterprise to a certain extent.In this regard,the paper selects the relevant data of A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2018 to explore the impact of analysts' follow-up on the degree of corporate tax avoidance.Through empirical tests,it is proved that whether there are analysts' tracking behavior and the number of tracking are significantly negatively related to the degree of tax radicalization of listed companies.The hypothesis is confirmed: the tax radicalization of listed companies with analyst follow-up is significantly lower than that of other companies;and the degree of tax avoidance is significantly reduced with the improvement of analyst follow-up;at the same time,compared with large-scale enterprises,the constraint of analysts' follow-up on corporate tax avoidance is more significant in small-scale companies.From the perspective of tax avoidance of listed companies,this paper proves that analysts' follow-up will produce "supervision effect" to a certain extent,and effectively reduce the probability of short-sighted "opportunism" behavior such as tax avoidance.On the one hand,it enriches and improves the literature of analysts' follow-up and enterprise tax avoidance in theory.On the other hand,it provides a new way for the tax department to supervise the tax collection and management,and it also contributes to the further improvement of China's capital market and the better standardization of the analyst industry.
Keywords/Search Tags:Analyst Follow-up, Corporate Tax Avoidance, Corporate Size
PDF Full Text Request
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