Research On Equilibriums Of The Supply-Chain Finance With The Reciprocal Behavior

Plenty of empirical studies and behavioral experiments show that people have bounded rational behavior.Reciprocal behavior is a bounded rational behavior which is prevalent in society.Enterprises in the supply chain will behave reciprocally in the longterm cooperative development.At the same time,many SMEs in supply chains face financing problems in their business activities.While be in the supply chain,members can raise fund by the trade credit and bank credit.Previous studies have neglected the influence of supply chain member reciprocity and other behavior factors on supply chain financing decision-making.It is of great theoretical and practical value to consider the supply chain financing equilibrium under the reciprocal behavior.Based on the theory of reciprocal behavior in behavioral economics,this paper builds a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer,and studies the influence of reciprocal behavior of retailers on supply chain financing equilibrium.Based on the dynamic game theory,the Stackelberg game model under the reciprocal behavior of bank credit financing and trade credit financing is constructed respectively to study the influence of retailer reciprocal behavior on supply chain financing equilibrium and make the comparative static analysis under completely rational equilibrium.Studies have shown that the higher the reciprocity of the retailer,the less profit is required to be distributed,so it will make reciprocal behavior.While suppliers will set higher wholesale prices to get more profits.Comparing the equilibrium results of rational retailers and reciprocal retailers,retailers considering reciprocal behavior will lead to a decline in the retailer's own profit level.The more reciprocal retailers tend to be,the greater the gap between their own profits and rational retailers' profit will be,which means,lower profits.Under the equilibrium of bank financing,the profit of reciprocal retailers is less than that of rational retailers.Therefore,in the case of bank credit financing,retailers tend to be rational.When the retailer decides to make reciprocal behavior,it will guarantee the market activity going well at the expense of its own interests.In the supply chain trade financing equilibrium under rational behavior,suppliers play the dual role of product suppliers and financial institutions.When the retailer is unable to repay the fund,the supplier will bear the production cost and the whole financing risk.Therefore,the supplier will set the wholesale price of the deferred payment to the retail price and take all the profits from the retailer.And the wholesale price of deferred payment that maximizes the profit of the supplier under reciprocal behavior will be less than the wholesale price of the deferred payment that maximizes the profit of the supplier under rational behavior.the optimal order quantity of retailers under reciprocal behavior will be higher than the optimal order quantity of retailers under rational behavior.Comparing the equilibrium results of rational retailers and reciprocal retailers,retailers' reciprocal behavior will lead to higher profit levels.The more reciprocal retailers tend to be,the greater the gap between their own profits and rational retailers' profit will be,which bears higher profits.Under the equilibrium of trade finance,the profit of reciprocal retailers is greater than that of rational retailers.Therefore,in the case of trade credit financing,retailers will tend to be reciprocity.The innovations of this paper are as follows: Firstly,based on the theory of reciprocal behavior in behavioral economics,the optimal profit ratio and fair value are introduced to describe the reciprocal behavior,and the utility function of the supply chain members when the retailer has reciprocal behavior is constructed.Secondly,under the reciprocal behavior,the Stackelberg game model of supply chain bank credit financing and supply chain trade credit financing is constructed respectively,and the comparative static analysis is taken under completely rational equilibrium.