Timing Disclosure And Market Reaction

Timing disclosure is a strategic opportunistic behavior of the management of listed companies.Most scholars choose the annual report appointment disclosure date or annual advance information of listed companies to study the timing disclosure,focusing on the effect of the theory of limited attention of investors in this process.However,on the one hand,the annual report of listed companies considering the actual disclosure of the day is often different from booking disclosure.On the other hand,considering the listed company's annual forecast information only covers the main indicators of net profit while other specific financial data indicators have not disclosed,enough to cause the market reaction of comprehensive and profound.Therefore,it is very important to study the official disclosure date of the annual report of listed companies.This paper adopts the method of theoretical analysis and empirical research,taking the ashare listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2017 as the sample,focuses on the existence of timing disclosure and the motivation behind the behavior,and discusses the market's reaction to timing disclosure.The findings are as follows :(1)it is true that listed companies in China choose the right time for disclosure,that is,good news is disclosed from Monday to Thursday,while bad news is disclosed from Friday to Saturday;(2)there are three motives for the management of listed companies to make timing disclosure: firstly,to gain(when meeting good news)or avoid(when meeting bad news)market attention;Maintain or even improve the company's stock liquidity;Thirdly,to facilitate the listed company internal personnel to profit from stock trading;(3)the degree of market reaction obtained by the company making selective disclosure is consistent with the expected direction of selective disclosure of good news,that is,the good news disclosed from Monday to Thursday has a larger market reaction,while the bad news disclosed from Friday to Saturday has a smaller market reaction.Further study found that the listed companies under the pressure of ST were less strongly motivated to disclose when they chose.After changing the measurement of market response variables and market concern as well as the means of narrowing the sample period,the main conclusions of this paper are still stable and valid.The research in this paper complements the research results in relevant fields and attempts to put forward Suggestions from the perspectives of government regulatory authorities,management of listed companies and investors in the capital market.