Research On The Motivation Of Equity Incentive Design Of State-owned Enterprises Under Political Promotion

As an important mechanism in corporate governance in China,equity incentives can effectively improve the company's business performance and reduce agency costs.However,there are many practical experiences that have found that equity incentives have become a means of management self-interest,and the academic community has not yet given quasi-determinism.Especially when the research object involves China's state-owned enterprises,the situation is more complicated.At present,the academic circles mainly explain the equity incentives of most state-owned enterprises based on the managerial power view,which is biased towards “welfare motives”.However,very few studies are based on the practice background of Chinese characteristics,taking the government as the controlling shareholder and the state-owned enterprise executives as having the characteristics of “politicians”,and explore the influence of political promotion and other factors on the motives of equity incentive design in state-owned enterprises.From the perspective of political promotion,this paper studies how it affects the motivation of equity incentive design of state-owned enterprises.Based on the principal-agent theory and the tournament theory,based on the background analysis of equity incentives and the incentives of state-owned enterprises,this paper uses the case study method to first evaluate the possibility of executives' political promotion,and then compares the corporate governance structure and internal motivation of the two companies.And the design characteristics of the equity incentive plan analyze the impact of political promotion,and compare and verify the implementation effect.This paper finds that the incentive effect of political promotion in state-owned enterprises will have an impact on the design motivation of state-owned enterprise executives' equity incentives.The state-owned enterprise executives with higher possibility of political promotion tend to favor incentive-type equity incentive design motivation to obtain higher-level government approval and thus promote Mainly;state-owned enterprise executives with low possibility of political promotion tend to favor the welfare-type equity incentive design motivation,taking into account their own investment and taking benefits.This paper proposes to enhance the importance of economic performance for political promotion.The state-owned enterprise equity incentive design appropriately incorporates relevant indicators of policy burden,establishes an incentive mechanism that is compatible with the state-owned enterprise executive compensation system,and accelerates the improvement of state-owned enterprise governance structure and professional manager market mechanism.The theoretical significance of this paper is to provide support for the construction or revision of the basic theory of equity incentives with Chinese characteristics.The practical significance is to guide state-owned enterprises to establish reasonable incentives for equity incentive design,to design more reasonable and effective programs,and to enhance incentives.Provide guidance and advice on results.