Bank-enterprise Relationship,Accounting Information Quality And Financing Constraints

Capital is the continuous driving force for the economic activities of enterprises.It is very important that the company can get a stable supply of funds and raise the funds needed for the combination of production factors timely and fully.However,for Chinese enterprises,financing constraints have become an important stumbling block for their own development.At the same time,from the whole society,financing constraints also seriously restrict the economy transformation and upgrading and make the social development difficult.So solving the problem of the financing constrains is the key to keep the continued development for the company.At present,due to the late start of China's financial market development,the channels to obtain financing for enterprises are very limited,and the types of financial instruments are also very single.Bank credit has become the main way of financing for Chinese enterprises.Bank-enterprise relationship can effectively reduce the asymmetry of information and increase the possibility of obtaining bank loans.In addition,accounting information can reflect the financial situation and operating conditions of the enterprise.The higher the quality of the accounting information is,the more information the external investors and debtors can get through with low cost.As a result,the external investors and bondholders are more willing to provide money for enterprises which has high-quality information with low-cost capital resources in the same circumstances.This also affects the financing behavior in a certain extent.Therefore,based on the institutional background,this paper explores the relationship among the bank-enterprise relationship,the quality of accounting information and financing constraints in order to provide data support and advice to break through the financing constraint for Chinese enterprises.Based on the previous research literature,this paper combines with asymmetric information theory,principal-agent theory and signaling theory in order to figure out the mechanism of financing constraints.And focuses on the relationship between the bank-enterprise relationship and financing constraints and the impact on the relationship between the bank-enterprise relationship and financing constraints which caused by the quality of accounting information by using of statistical methods to establish regression model.Using listed companies of A share in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Markets in 2012-2016 as the sample,the paper explores the impact of bank-enterprise relationship and accounting information quality on corporate financing constraints.The study shows that:(1)the problem of financing constraints is common in the listed companies in China.It is difficult for enterprises to escape such constraints,whether it is a private enterprise or a state-owned enterprise.(2)the bank association established by the enterprise can significantly alleviate the financing constraints of the enterprise.(3)after introducing the quality of accounting information in the regression model,it is found that the quality of accounting information has an alternative effect on the relationship between the banks-enterprises association and the financing constraints.(4)the substitution effect of the quality of accounting information has different expression forms in the state-owned enterprises and the private enterprises.Compared with the state-owned enterprises,the quality of accounting information in the sample of private enterprises is more significant to the banks-enterprise relationship.The above findings provide new empirical evidence for understanding how the banks-enterprise relationship and the quality of accounting information jointly affect the financing constraints of Chinese listed companies.