A Comparative Study Of Two Cases Of Corporate M & A Performance Commitment

With the rapid development of China's economy,the competitive pressure in all walks of life is also increasing.The state has introduced the performance compensation system in order to ease the pricing distortion,weaken the information asymmetry between the two sides and promote the success of the transaction.Since its introduction,the performance compensation system has been more and more favored by the m&a market.The performance commitment agreement signed by the two parties mainly includes the following two points: Two,compensation.Performance commitment indicators are diverse;Compensation methods mainly include cash compensation and equity compensation.This will also bring different incentive effects and risks to the merger and acquisition enterprises,thus making the quality of the merger and acquisition uneven.This paper takes Beijing huayi schwab co.,LTD.Mergers and acquisitions diss media co.,LTD in tianjin,xin xian department materials co.,LTD.Mergers and acquisitions their co.,LTD as a case,pay attention to the question is: case company in different performance pledge agreement signed in acquisition,huayi schwab merger with high quality to complete performance commitment agreement and sunko's material acquisition in performance commitment period complete performance commitment agreement "on line".How does the performance commitment agreement affect the quality of the merger between the two companies? This paper intends to conduct a comparative study on the operating performance of the two companies from the perspective of the setting of performance commitment indicators and the selection of compensation methods,and then explore the impact of different performance commitment agreement terms on the quality of merger and acquisition from the perspective of the signing of the content of the agreement.At first,this paper starting from the risk of a single profit targets easily induce,analyze diversified performance indicators of risk prevention,the second compared to cash compensation and equity compensation induced different risk,as well as the terms of compensation for risk prevention effect,finally combining with the case company performance commitment period before and after the change of financial indicators,goodwill,analyzing performance commitment agreement on the underlying the effect of enterprise operating performance and quality of mergers and acquisitions.It is helpful for both parties to reasonably choose the commitment indicators and compensation methods when signing the performance commitment agreement,to help enterprises to scientifically and rationally use the performance compensation agreement,to reduce the risk of merger failure,and to provide support for the rapid development of enterprises.Through the comparative analysis of two cases,the conclusion is drawn: first,diversified performance indicators can better prevent and control merger and acquisition risks and improve the operating quality of target enterprises than single profit indicators.Conclusion 2: stock compensation has better risk prevention and control and incentive effect than cash compensation.