A Case Study On The Tunneling Behavior Of The Controlling Shareholds Of Gosun Holding

In many listed companies in China,controlling shareholders control the decision-making and operation of listed companies through indirect shareholding and other means by occupying the board of directors and key management positions,seize the assets of listed companies and infringe on the rights and interests of minority shareholders.The methods of transferring the interests by the controlling shareholders are complicated and hidden.The case study of interest transferring by controlling shareholders is of practical importance to the identification of such companies by minority shareholders and for the amendment of related regulation and policy omissions to authorities.This paper takes a listed company,Gosun Holding,as an example,analyzes its operation history,how the controlling shareholders obtained the equity of listed company,as a result of the deviation of control rights and cash-flow rights,the controlling shareholders have strong motive to carry out the interest transmission.Starting with the analysis of the risks implied in the ownership structure,this paper does a concrete analysis of the controlling shareholders manipulating the listed companies by using the business transformation as an opportunity,through the disposal of assets,acquisition of assets and other ways of interest transmission.And then it continues to analyze how the controlling shareholders use the control rights and information pre-emptive advantages,to transfer interest to controlling shareholders in the process of disposing assets through manipulating the evaluation reports,private placement of additional discounts to controlling shareholders,exaggerated asset prices,pledged shares to provide loans and unauthorized loan guarantees to the controlling shareholders.Controlling shareholders even directly transfer company assets to themselves.While all these are at the cost of infringing the interests of minority shareholders and the only purpose is to enrich controlling shareholders.As another case of listed companies' tunneling behavior,it can provide more information on the relevant research,deepen the understanding of agency theory,and provide reference for regulatory departments to further improve the detailed regulations of private placement,and improve the governance structure of listed companies and relevant laws and regulations on disclosure requirements.At the same time,it also reminds investors that they need to make research and study by themselves as well,draw their own independent conclusions,so as to make rational investment decisions.