The Salary Gap Within The Executives And Corporate Risk-taking

The separation of the two rights is one of the symbols of the company in the modern economic environment.The separation of the ownership and the management rights of the company has led to a variety of situations,including information asymmetry and inconsistent goals,which aggravates the agency problem.Senior executives play an important role in the operation and development of the company,and have a significant impact on the company's business activities and risk decision-making.The owners of the company hope to restrict the self-interest behavior of the executives through the compensation system,so as to achieve the purpose of alleviating the agency problem between the shareholders and the management,and promote the goal of the executives to be consistent with it.After the1980 s,with the beginning and deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises,China's manager market has gradually formed.With the rapid development and growth of China's economy,the latter manager's salary has been raised rapidly,so that the phenomenon of "sky high salary" is widespread,which has aroused the attention of many scholars and the widespread concern of the society.Many articles study whether the executive compensation system can affect the behavior of the executives,thus affecting the performance of the company.Few articles pay attention to the impact of the executive compensation gap on the risk-taking of the enterprise.This paper selects relevant data of Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2017 as the initial research sample,measures the internal compensation gap of top executives based on the monetary compensation level of the first top executive and other top executives except the first one,measures the risk-taking level of enterprises based on the volatility of asset return rate,establishes regression model and conducts empirical test and robustness test to explore How does the compensation gap affect the risk-taking of enterprises and how does the nature of the actual controller,the growth of the company and the degree of marketization affect the correlation between the two.The conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)there is a significant negative correlation between the internal compensation gap of executives and the level of risk-taking;(2)compared with non-state-owned holding enterprises,the internal compensation gap and risk-taking of executives are more negatively correlated in state-owned holding enterprises;(3)compared with low growth enterprises,the internal compensation gap and risk-taking of executives are negatively correlated in high growth enterprises Stronger;(4)compared with the low degree of marketization,the higher degree of marketization,the negative impact of the internal compensation gap on the level of risk-taking is smaller.In this paper,a more comprehensive management compensation measurement standard is used to further enrich the research content of compensation gap and enterprise risk-taking.After that,this paper establishes a model to test the economic consequences of risk-taking and whether the internal compensation gap of senior managers can affect the economic consequences of risk-taking.The results show that the level of risk-taking is positively related to the enterprise value,and the internal compensation gap of senior managers has a significant negative impact on the economic consequences of risk-taking.Finally,according to the research results of this paper,the corresponding policy recommendations are put forward:(1)pay attention to the rationality of executive compensation gap;(2)carry out reasonable venture capital behavior;(3)strengthen the disclosure of executive compensation information of listed companies.