Research On The Participation Of Non-state-owned Industrial Investors In The Mixed Reform Of Competitive Local State-owned Enterprises And The High-level Power Allocation Of Non-state Shareholders

Mixed ownership has always been an important path for the reform of state-owned enterprises.The report of the 19 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China once again clearly stated that “deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises and developing a mixed-ownership economy”.Mixed reform includes two parts: "mixed" and "reformed".The core of "reformed" is to give non-state shareholders a right to speak.Recently,provinces have promoted the market-oriented reform of competitive state-owned enterprises in accordance with the "Guiding Opinions on Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises" of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council.However,the phenomenon of "mixing" and "changing" is very prominent.Existing research has explored the governance role of non-state shareholders mainly on the aspects of executive compensation incentives,internal control quality,capital cost and accounting information quality.but research on the classification and hierarchical governance of mixed state-owned enterprises is still rare.Compare fewer layers.In addition,there is very little literature to study the influencing factors of the governance mechanism and rights distribution of non-state shareholders.It does not touch on the fundamentals of the reform of mixed ownership.Through theoretical analysis,this paper bases on the differences in shareholder resources and risk-bearing,and follows the market-oriented approach.The theoretical scheme and realization path of the rights distribution of non-state shareholders of competitive local state-owned enterprises are of great significance in the context of the current comprehensive deepening of state-owned enterprises' reforms.This article selects the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share competitive local state-owned listed companies from 2011 to 2018 as the research object,and manually collects relevant data on the participation of non-state-owned industrial investors and non-state-owned shareholders in governance.It mainly studies from the perspective of high-level governance.The industrial investors conduct subdivided research on the impact of non-state-owned shareholders' power allocation on different positions,and explore the game results of local government and non-state-owned shareholders in mixed reform.The research results show that:(1)Under the same conditions,if there are industrial shareholders among non-state-owned shareholders,the non-state-owned shareholders are given greater high-level governance authority,which will improve the state of high-level governance of state-owned enterprises,especially the non-state-owned shareholders' appointment The condition of the manager,this conclusion still holds after considering endogenous issues and a series of robustness tests;(2)In areas with a weaker institutional environment and stronger government intervention,industrial investors have a positive role in serving non-state shareholders as general directors and supervisors,but a negative role in serving as executive directors and executives;(3)In further research,it was found that the participation of non-state-owned industrial investors in mixed reform can significantly improve corporate performance,especially by serving as executive directors and senior management personnel.The research in this article not only enriches the literature on the heterogeneity of non-state-owned shareholders in the allocation of high-level governance power to mixed-ownership enterprises,but also on how to improve the governance of competitive local state-owned enterprises.Shareholders' demands and improving the performance of state-owned enterprises have certain reference value.